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The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission implemented a safety goal policy in 
response to the 1979 Three Mile Island accident. This policy addresses the question 
“How safe is safe enough?” by specifying quantitative health objectives (QHOs) for 
comparison with results from nuclear power plant (NPP) probabilistic risk analyses 
(PRAs) to determine whether proposed regulatory actions are justified based on 
potential safety benefit. Lessons learned from recent operating experience—
including the 2011 Fukushima accident—indicate that accidents involving multiple 
units at a shared site can occur with non-negligible frequency. Yet risk contributions 
from such scenarios are excluded by policy from safety goal evaluations—even for 
the nearly 60% of U.S. NPP sites that include multiple units. This research develops 
and applies methods for estimating risk metrics for comparison with safety goal 
QHOs using models from state-of-the-art consequence analyses to evaluate the 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
I.A. Safety Goals for Commercial Nuclear Power Plant Operations 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) safety goal policy1 broadly 
defines an acceptable level of radiological risk to public health and safety from 
potential accidental releases of radiological materials from operating reactor units at 
commercial nuclear power plant (NPP) sites. The USNRC developed and evaluated 
safety goals in response to growing stakeholder concerns following the March 1979 
accident involving Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station about: (1) the 
adequacy of NPP safety; and (2) whether the costs of regulatory actions 
implemented in response to the accident to further enhance NPP safety were 
justified based on the incremental safety benefit and the level of residual risk to the 
public from nuclear accidents. The safety goal policy communicates one aspect of 
the USNRC’s risk management philosophy; in essence, it addresses the question 
“How safe is safe enough?” for regulatory decisions regarding NPP safety. In 
practice, it guides agency evaluations to determine whether proposed regulatory 
actions that would impose additional requirements to enhance NPP safety beyond 
those needed to ensure adequate protection are justified based on their potential 
safety benefit, relative to the level of residual risk to the public. Using this approach, 
proposed regulatory actions that aim to enhance NPP safety can be rejected—even 
if potentially cost-beneficial—because the level of residual risk to the public is 
acceptably low, and limited resources could thus be better applied to alternative 
courses of action.2,3 
The safety goal policy is based on a hierarchical framework comprised of two high-




objectives (QHOs) that can be used to determine whether and to what extent each 
qualitative safety goal has been achieved. The first qualitative safety goal addresses 
risks to individual members of the public and is supported by a QHO for average 
individual early [prompt] fatality risk (hereafter termed the “early fatality risk QHO”). 
The second qualitative safety goal is intended to address societal risk, but is 
supported by a QHO for average individual latent cancer fatality risk (hereafter 
termed the “latent cancer fatality risk QHO”). The qualitative safety goals and 
supporting QHOs are summarized in Table I. 
Table I. USNRC Qualitative Safety Goals and Quantitative Health Objectives1 
 
I.B. Probabilistic Analysis Techniques 
In the nuclear industry, two principal analytic techniques have been used to estimate 
measures of average individual early fatality risk and latent cancer fatality risk for 
comparison to the safety goal QHOs: (1) probabilistic risk analysis (PRA); and (2) 
probabilistic consequence analysis (PCA). PRA is a systematized analytic technique 
that can be used to characterize the risk of one or more adverse outcomes of interest 
caused by potential failures involving complex engineered systems—including NPPs. 
The traditional scenario-based approach to PRA involves systematic application of 
Individual Risk Societal Risk
High-Level Qualitative 
Safety Goal
“Individual members of the public should be 
provided a level of protection from the 
consequences of nuclear power plant 
operation such that individuals bear no 
significant additional risk to life and health.”
“Societal risks to life and health from 
nuclear power plant operation should be 
comparable to or less than the risks of 
generating electricity by viable competing 
technologies and should not be a 




“The risk to an average individual in the 
vicinity of a nuclear power plant a of prompt 
fatalities that might result from reactor 
accidents should not exceed 0.1% of the 
sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from 
other accidents to which the members of the 
U.S. population are generally exposed.”
“The risk to the population in the area 
near a nuclear power plant c of cancer 
fatalities that might result from nuclear 
power plant operation should not exceed 
0.1% of the sum of cancer fatality risks 
resulting from all other causes.”
Hierarchy Level
Type of Risk Addressed
a The USNRC safety goal policy statement defines “in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant” as the area within one 
mile of a NPP site boundary.
c The USNRC safety goal policy statement defines “in the area near a nuclear power plant” as the area within ten 




methods, models, data, and analytical tools to develop answers to three fundamental 
questions that underlie a widely accepted quantitative definition of risk: (1) "What can 
go wrong?"; (2) "How likely is it to occur?"; and (3) "If it does occur, what are the 
consequences?".4 In this framework, the risk attributable to accidents caused by 
potential failures involving complex engineered systems is characterized by an 
ordered set of triplets comprised of scenarios, frequencies, and consequences. In 
performing a PRA, the goal is for this set of “risk triplets” to capture a reasonably 
complete spectrum of possible accident scenarios to provide reasonable assurance 
that important risk contributors are not missed.4 
PCA is used to estimate the third element of the risk triplet by quantifying conditional 
measures of the offsite public health, environmental, and economic consequences, 
conditioned on the occurrence of a postulated accidental release of radiological 
materials from a nuclear facility. PCAs can be performed either as part of Level 3 
PRAs for NPPs, or independently for other purposes. In NPP Level 3 PRAs, the 
output of PRA logic models that estimate the frequencies of a representative set of 
radiological release categories intended to capture a reasonably complete spectrum 
of possible accident scenarios is typically combined with the meanb conditional PCA 
results for each release category.5 For each outcome of interest, these frequency-
weighted mean consequences are then summed across all radiological release 
categories to estimate the mean annual risk of that outcome. Results from NPP 
Level 3 PRAs and from PCAs performed for other purposes can include measures 
                                                
b Common PCA tools for NPP applications can use probabilistic sampling techniques to 
account for what has been shown in previous studies to be a dominant contributor to 
uncertainty in the offsite public health consequences for a given accidental release—when 
the accident will occur and what the prevailing weather conditions will be for the duration of 
the release(s). Using these probabilistic sampling techniques, PCA tools can generate 
distributions for selected consequence metrics that reflect variability in consequences arising 
from statistical variability in weather conditions; the mean conditional PCA results then 
represent the probability-weighted average for the selected consequence metric over all 




of: (1) average individual early fatality risk within one mile of the NPP site boundary; 
and (2) average latent cancer fatality risk within ten miles of the NPP site boundary. 
These results have historically been compared to the corresponding safety goal 
QHOs to: (1) determine whether and to what extent the qualitative safety goals have 
been achieved; or (2) provide an additional perspective or reference point for 
interpreting results within a safety goal QHO context. 
I.C. Research Motivation 
In the U.S., a majority of NPP sites include multiple operating reactor units co-
located at a shared site. As shown in Figure 1, 52% (32 out of 61) of U.S. NPP sites 
include two operating reactor units and 5% (3 out of 61) include three operating 
reactor units;6 nearly 60% of all U.S. NPP sites are thus multi-unit sites. However, 
during development and evaluation of the safety goal policy, the USNRC decided 
that the safety goals and QHOs would be applied strictly on a per-reactor-unit basis, 
even for this majority of multi-unit sites; the rationale for this decision was to avoid 
imposing a regulatory bias against multi-unit sites that may be subject to stricter 
requirements if the safety goals and QHOs were to be applied on a per-site basis.7 
As a result, accident scenarios involving concurrent radiological releases from 
multiple co-located operating reactor units have—with few exceptions—traditionally 
been excluded from NPP PRAs and safety goal evaluations in support of analyses 
for proposed regulatory actions. 
Yet there are at least three compelling reasons for expanding the scope of NPP 






1. Previous NPP PRA insights: Findings from previous NPP PRAs that included a 
limited treatment of multi-unit accident scenarios (e.g., the Seabrook Station 
Probabilistic Safety Assessment)8 suggest that the contribution to reactor 
accident risk from such scenarios is not negligible and could be significant, 
depending on site-specific factors that influence the potential for dependent 
failure events or adverse interactions across multiple units.c 
2. Operating experience: Lessons learned from the March 2011 accident at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) in Japan9-11—together with 
findings from a recent review of licensee event report (LER) system data for U.S. 
NPPs12,13—demonstrate that adverse events (e.g., abnormal occurrences, 
incidents, or accidents) involving multiple operating reactor units co-located at a 
shared site can and do occur at a non-negligible frequency.d 
3. Logical reasoning: Table I shows that people living in the vicinity of or area near 
NPP sites are the defined target population for the safety goals and QHOs.1 For 
multi-unit NPP sites, this population is not only exposed to the health and safety 
                                                
c In probability theory, two events A and B are considered to be dependent when the 
probability of their joint occurrence (termed “the intersection of A and B,” which is 
mathematically represented by the term “𝐴 ∩ 𝐵”) is not equal to the product of the 
probabilities for each event. The equivalent mathematical statement if A and B are dependent 
events is: 𝑃 𝐴 ∩ 𝐵 = 𝑃 𝐴 ∙ 𝑃 𝐵 𝐴 = 𝑃 𝐵 ∙ 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) ≠ 𝑃 𝐴 ∙ 𝑃(𝐵). For dependent events, 
this inequality arises from dependencies that cause the conditional probability of an event, 
given the occurrence of another event, to be different from the event’s unconditional 
probability. The equivalent mathematical statements for the given example are: 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) ≠
𝑃(𝐴) and 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) ≠ 𝑃(𝐵). Where dependencies exist, these can reduce or eliminate 
redundancy in design. As a result, dependencies usually cause the probability of the joint 
occurrence of failure events to be greater than the product of the probabilities of independent 
failure events. For this reason, dependencies between multiple reactor units at a shared NPP 
site are an important consideration in evaluating the contribution to risk from multi-unit 
accident scenarios. 
d Based on the recent review of LER system data, Schroer developed a dependent failure 
event classification scheme to characterize potential dependencies across multiple units so 
that single-unit PRA models could to be integrated into a multi-unit PRA model for a shared 
NPP site. This classification scheme is comprised of six different categories of dependencies 
that could influence multi-unit risk: (1) initiating events, (2) shared connections, (3) identical 





risks posed by single-unit accident scenarios in which isolated accidents 
involving single operating reactor units occur; they are also exposed to the 
potentially significant health and safety risks from possible multi-unit accident 
scenarios that operating experience has shown can and do occur. It therefore 
stands to reason that the contributions to risk from such multi-unit accident 
scenarios should be considered in safety goal policy applications.  
 
Figure 1. Discrete Frequency Distribution of U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Sites by Number 
of Operating Reactor Units per Site. Nearly 60% of U.S. NPP sites are multi-unit sites 
comprised of two or three operating reactor units. 
This existing gap in the scope and application of the safety goal policy can have 
important implications. In particular, since multi-unit accident scenarios are excluded 
from the scope of NPP PRAs and supporting PCAs, the true total accident risk for 
reactor units that are co-located with other units at multi-unit NPP sites may be 
underestimated. As a result, safety goal evaluations of proposed regulatory actions 




































protection—and thereby reduce the overall residual risk to public health and safety 
from NPP accidents—may conclude that these proposed actions would not be 
justified based on a low level of residual risk to the public. These proposed actions 
would therefore be rejected before detailed cost-benefit analyses would be 
performed to determine whether this subset of decision analysis techniques indicate 
the actions could result in a net benefit to society and thus improve societal welfare. 
I.D. Research Aims 
The overall aim of this research is to evaluate the potential policy implications of 
expanding the scope and application of the safety goal policy to include 
consideration of the risk contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios for multi-unit 
NPP sites. From this overall research aim, three specific aims were developed to 
guide this investigation: 
1. Specific Aim 1: To evaluate the effect of including the contribution from multi-
unit accident scenarios to safety goal QHO risk metrics in safety goal policy 
applications. For this aim, base case analyses were performed that relied on two 
assumptions that each influence one element of the risk triplet for multi-unit 
accident scenarios: 
a. Frequency: The conditional probability of an accident occurring in a co-
located unit, given that an accident involving at least one unit at the NPP site 
occurs at a specified frequency, was assumed to be 0.1. This implies a 10% 
chance of a co-located unit experiencing an accident scenario, given that 
single-unit accident scenarios occur at the site with a specified frequency. 
Results and insights from previous multi-unit NPP PRA studies and operating 




global average conditional probability of 0.1 is assumed to apply across all 
multi-unit accident scenarios. In reality, each multi-unit accident scenario can 
have a unique conditional probability given the occurrence of a specified 
single-unit accident scenario.  
b. Consequences: Multi-unit accident scenarios were assumed to occur 
simultaneously, with no timing offset between concurrent accidents involving 
multiple units. The hypothesis underlying this assumption is that 
simultaneous accidents will result in the most severe offsite consequences, 
though this may not be the case for all consequence metrics of interest. 
2. Specific Aim 2: To evaluate the effect on findings from Specific Aim 1 of using 
plausible alternative assumptions about the level of dependence between co-
located reactor units at a shared NPP site. For this aim, one-way sensitivity 
analyses were performed to evaluate the effect of varying the conditional 
probability of an accident in a co-located unit given a single-unit accident 
frequency over a range of plausible values. 
3. Specific Aim 3: To evaluate the effect on findings from Specific Aim 1 of using 
plausible alternative assumptions about the timing of multi-unit accident 
scenarios and the constituent releases that comprise each multi-unit release. For 
this aim, one-way sensitivity analyses were performed to evaluate the effect of 
varying a timing offset parameter over a range of plausible values. This 
parameter is used to represent potential differences in the timing of accident 
initiation, progression, and radiological releases between concurrent accident 




I.E. Research Study Design 
I.E.1. Safety Goal Policy Alternatives 
Two safety goal policy alternatives were selected for this evaluation: 
1. Option 1 (Status Quo): Only Single-Unit Accident Scenarios Included. This 
option represents the status quo with respect to how the safety goal policy is 
applied on a per-reactor unit basis. Only the contribution from single-unit accident 
scenarios is included in estimating the safety goal QHO risk metrics for 
comparison to the QHOs. 
2. Option 2: Single-Unit and Multi-Unit Accident Scenarios Included. This 
option represents a hypothetical expansion in scope and application of the safety 
goal policy in applying the policy on a per-reactor unit basis. The contribution 
from both single-unit accident scenarios and multi-unit accident scenarios is 
included in estimating the safety goal QHO risk metrics for comparison to the 
QHOs. 
I.E.2. Figures of Merit 
Two figures of merit based on the safety goal QHO risk metrics for average individual 
early fatality risk and average individual latent cancer fatality risk were selected to 
evaluate the effects of this expansion in scope: 
1. Figure of Merit 1: Percent change in meane safety goal QHO risk metric 
results. The first figure of merit is the percent change in the mean value for each 
                                                
e As stated earlier, PCA codes—including the one used in this research—are capable of 
estimating the probability distribution for each consequence metric it calculates. These 
distributions reflect the uncertainty in consequence results arising from statistical variability in 
the offsite weather conditions and when in a year an accident scenario will occur. Consistent 
with guidance provided in the USNRC Safety Goal Policy Statement,1 only estimates of the 




safety goal QHO risk metric when comparing Option 2 results to Option 1 results. 
This provides a measure of the impact of including the risk contribution from 
multi-unit accident scenarios on each safety goal QHO risk metric. 
2. Figure of Merit 2: Percent change in mean QHO margin. The second figure of 
merit is the percent change in the mean value for the margin to each QHO when 
comparing Option 2 results to Option 1 results. This provides a measure of the 
impact of including the risk contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios on the 
margin to each QHO.f 
I.E.3. Study Population and Accident Scenarios 
This research builds upon a recent USNRC-sponsored PCA study that is commonly 
referred to as the “State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) 
Project.”14-16 The SOARCA pilot study developed state-of-the-art accident 
progression and offsite radiological consequence models to characterize realistic 
outcomes of a select set of single-unit accident scenarios that were judged to be 
more important. For the pilot study, detailed models and integrated analyses were 
performed for single operating reactor units at two representative U.S. NPP sites that 
are each comprised of two operating reactor units: (1) Peach Bottom Atomic Power 
Station, Unit 2 (hereafter termed “Peach Bottom”); and (2) Surry Power Station, Unit 
1 (hereafter termed “Surry”).g The single-unit accident scenarios were selected 
based on expert judgments about their relative importance with respect to: (1) the 
likelihood of causing damage to the nuclear fuel in the reactor core (termed “core 
                                                
f The margin to each QHO can be viewed as the relative distance between the QHO and the 
value for the corresponding safety goal QHO risk metric. This type of measure can provide 
information about the factor by which the value of a safety goal QHO risk metric would need 
to increase to reach the corresponding QHO. 
g Multi-unit accident scenarios involving co-located reactor units at each NPP site (Unit 3 at 




damage”); or (2) the potential to cause significant offsite radiological health 
consequences, assuming each accident scenario were to occur. A summary of the 
single-unit accident scenarios evaluated for each NPP site in the SOARCA pilot 
study is provided in Table II and Table III. 
To address the aims for this research, state-of-the-art consequence models were 
constructed for all possible combinations of two-unit accident scenarios that could be 
created by combining the single-unit accident scenarios that were modeled and 
evaluated for each NPP site in the SOARCA pilot study. These two-unit accident 
scenario models were developed and evaluated using the MELCOR Accident 
Consequence Analysis Code System (MACCS) suite of analytical tools. MACCS is a 
USNRC-sponsored PCA code that integrates probabilistic and phenomenological 
models to account for multiple factors that influence the offsite consequences of 
accidental releases, including: (1) statistical variability in weather conditions over 
time; (2) atmospheric transport and dispersion of released radiological materials; (3) 
offsite population characteristics; (4) protective actions taken to reduce radiological 
dose; and (5) dose-response models used to estimate radiological health effects.17,18 
MACCS was recently enhanced to include a multi-source model that allows users to 
model and analyze concurrent accidental releases from multiple co-located units at a 
shared nuclear facility that can have unique accident progression timelines and 
radionuclide inventories. Event trees and decision trees are useful tools for 
illustrating the possible combinations that can arise from combining sequential 
events and/or decisions. Figures 2 and 3 respectively show that: (1) nine two-unit 
accident scenario models for Peach Bottom Unit 2 and Unit 3h can be created from 
all possible combinations of the three single-unit accident scenarios evaluated for 
                                                




Peach Bottom as part of the SOARCA pilot study; and (2) 16 two-unit accident 
scenario models for Surry Unit 1 and Unit 2 can be created from all possible 
combinations of the four single-unit accident scenarios evaluated for Surry. Together, 
this results in a total of 25 two-unit accident scenario models across both 
representative NPP sites. 
For each of these 25 two-unit accident scenario models, MACCS was used to 
perform eight discrete probabilistic accident simulations to calculate the conditional 
consequence contribution to safety goal QHO risk metrics. One simulation 
represented the base case analysis that assumed the constituent accident scenarios 
that comprise each two-unit accident scenario occur simultaneously. The remaining 
seven simulations represented sensitivity cases for two-unit accident scenarios in 
which the timing offset between concurrent accidents involving both units was varied 
from 1 to 7 days, in one-day increments.i The purpose of these one-way sensitivity 
analyses was to evaluate the effect on results of using plausible alternative 
assumptions about the potential difference in timing between accident initiation, 
progression, and radiological releases across co-located units. Collectively, this 
resulted in a total of 200 two-unit accident simulations across both NPP sites  
                                                
i A limited set of sensitivity analyses were also performed to evaluate the effect of varying the 
timing offset parameter from 1 to 24 hours in one-hour increments. Only results for one-way 
sensitivity analyses using the 1 to 7 day range in one-day increments are presented for two 
reasons: (1) results did not converge within 24 hours for some two-unit accident scenarios, 
indicating the need to perform sensitivity analyses using timing offsets greater than 24 hours; 





Table II. Single-Unit Accident Scenarios Evaluated in the SOARCA Pilot Study14-16 
 
Table III. Single-Unit Accident Scenario Descriptions for the SOARCA Pilot Study14-16 
 
Accident Accident Accident Accident
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Peach Bottom LTSBO STSBO–Base STSBO–RCIC N/A




NPP safety systems are powered by alternating current (AC) power. 
This ac power is normally supplied by offsite power sources via the 
electrical grid, but can be supplied by onsite backup power sources 
such as emergency diesel generators, if needed. An SBO involves 
the total loss of AC power that results when both offsite and onsite 
AC power sources fail. During an SBO, reactor cooling is temporarily 
provided by systems that do not rely on AC power, such as pumps 
driven by steam turbines. Onsite batteries can temporarily supply 
direct current (DC) power to control these turbine-driven pumps and 
to power instrumentation until battery depletion.
LTSBO Long-Term Station Blackout
An earthquake causes a loss of all AC power sources, but onsite 
batteries are able to supply DC power to safety systems for about 4-
8 hours until battery depletion.
STSBO Short-Term Station Blackout
An earthquake more extreme than the LTSBO scenario earthquake 
causes a total loss of all AC and DC power sources, immediately 
rendering safety systems inoperable. As a result, onset of damage to 
nuclear fuel in the reactor core occurs in the “short-term.” This base 
case is identified as “STSBO-Base” in Table II.
RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
This scenario-identified as “STSBO-RCIC” in Table II-is a variation of 
the STSBO that applies only to BWR NPPs, which include the RCIC 
system. This scenario was selected for evaluation because the 
modeled NPP site (Peach Bottom) had explicit procedures for 
operating the RCIC system using portable electric generators in SBO 
conditions to provide reactor cooling.
TISGTR Thermally-Induced Steam Generator Tube Rupture
This scenario-identified as “STSBO-TISGTR” in Table II-is a lower 
probability variation of the STSBO that applies only to PWR NPPs, 
which include steam generators for steam production. While the 
reactor core is overheating and water available for heat transfer in 
the steam generators is boiling off, extremely hot steam and 
hydrogen circulating through the steam generator cause a tube to 
rupture; this creates a pathway for radiological materials to escape 
from the reactor coolant system to the NPP’s non-radiological 
systems, and potentially to the environment.
ISLOCA Interfacing Systems Loss-Of-Coolant Accident
A random failure of valves ruptures low-pressure system piping 
outside the containment building that connects with the high-
pressure reactor coolant system piping that is inside the containment 
building. This failure bypasses the defense-in-depth layer of 
protection provided by the containment building, thereby resulting in 
a more rapid radiological release to the environment, with greater 





Figure 2. Two-Unit Accident Scenario Models for Peach Bottom Unit 2 and Unit 3. Nine 
two-unit accident scenario models were constructed from all possible combinations of the 
three single-unit accident scenario models for Peach Bottom Unit 2 that were evaluated in the 
SOARCA pilot study. 
 
 
Figure 3. Two-Unit Accident Scenario Models for Surry Unit 1 and Unit 2. Sixteen two-
unit accident scenario models were constructed from all possible combinations of the four 
single-unit accident scenario models for Surry Unit 1 that were evaluated in the SOARCA 
pilot study. 
ID No. Two-Unit Accident Scenario
Unit 2: STSBO-RCIC, Unit 3: STSBO-RCIC
BWR8
BWR9
Unit 2: LTSBO, Unit 3: LTSBO
Unit 2: LTSBO, Unit 3: STSBO-Base
Unit 2: LTSBO, Unit 3: STSBO-RCIC
Unit 2: STSBO-Base, Unit 3: LTSBO
Unit 2: STSBO-Base, Unit 3: STSBO-Base
Unit 2: STSBO-Base, Unit 3: STSBO-RCIC
Unit 2: STSBO-RCIC, Unit 3: LTSBO






Select Unit 2 Accident Scenario
Select Unit 3 Accident Scenario
Select Unit 3 Accident Scenario
BWR1















ID No. Two-Unit Accident Scenario
Unit 1: STSBO-TISGTR, Unit 2: ISLOCA
Unit 1: ISLOCA, Unit 2: LTSBO
Unit 1: ISLOCA, Unit 2: STSBO-Base
Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: LTSBO
Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: STSBO-Base
Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: STSBO-TISGTR
Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: ISLOCA
Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: LTSBO
Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: STSBO-Base
PWR13
PWR14
Unit 1: ISLOCA, Unit 2: ISLOCA
Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: STSBO-TISGTR
Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: ISLOCA
Unit 1: STSBO-TISGTR, Unit 2: LTSBO
Unit 1: STSBO-TISGTR, Unit 2: STSBO-Base
Unit 1: STSBO-TISGTR, Unit 2: STSBO-TISGTR
PWR15
PWR16
Select Unit 1 Accident Scenario
Select Unit 2 Accident Scenario
Select Unit 2 Accident Scenario
Select Unit 2 Accident Scenario






































I.F. Key Assumptions 
This study design relies on a number of key assumptions: 
1. The modeled NPP sites are representative of the population of multi-unit 
NPP sites. The two NPP sites selected for modeling and evaluation as part of 
this research constitute only 6% (2 out of 35) of the population of multi-unit NPP 
sites in the U.S. However, these NPP sites utilize reactor and containment 
designs similar to those used at sites that collectively represent 74% (26 out of 
35) of U.S. multi-unit NPP sites. This analysis therefore assumes that the two 
modeled NPP sites are representative of the population of U.S. multi-unit NPP 
sites in any attempts to generalize its findings beyond the study population. 
2. The two operating reactor units co-located at each NPP site are identical. 
The consequence model for each two-unit accident scenario is constructed by 
combining the radiological release inputs to the consequence models from two 
single-unit accident scenarios that were modeled in the SOARCA pilot study. In 
this approach, the first single-unit accident scenario represents the accident 
scenario that occurs in the reference unitj, while the second represents the 
concurrent accident scenario that occurs in the co-located unit. Since all of the 
models for the SOARCA pilot study were based on one unit at each NPP site 
(Unit 2 at Peach Bottom and Unit 1 at Surry), use of these models to represent 
concurrent accident scenarios at the co-located units at each NPP site (Unit 3 at 
Peach Bottom and Unit 2 at Surry) implicitly assumes the co-located units are 
identical to the units modeled in the SOARCA pilot study. While safety analysis 
reports for each site indicate this assumption of symmetry is reasonable, there 
                                                
j The need for identifying which unit serves as the reference unit for the two-unit accident 




can be subtle differences between the co-located units that can lead to biased 
estimates of their risk contributions. In fact, this issue is not unique to the Peach 
Bottom and Surry NPP sites; while co-located units at shared NPP sites in the 
U.S. are typically similar in many respects, it is widely recognized that nearly all 
co-located units have some differences in design and operation. 
3. One unit always serves as the reference unit for two-unit accident 
scenarios. For each two-unit accident scenario, one unit at each NPP site is 
assumed to be the reference unit. For Peach Bottom, the reference unit is Unit 2; 
for Surry, the reference unit is Unit 1. This assumption simplifies the analysis by 
requiring the analyst to specify a value for only one additional parameter in 
implementing the new multi-source model in MACCS; this parameter specifies 
the timing offset between the releases from the co-located unit, relative to those 
from the reference unit. This assumption therefore does not impact the base 
case analyses in which two-unit accident scenarios are assumed to occur 
simultaneously. However, for one-way sensitivity analyses in which the timing 
offset between concurrent accidents involving both units is varied, this 
assumption means the reference unit’s accident scenario will always progress 
ahead of the co-located unit’s accident scenario. If the assumption of identical 
units holds, this assumption will have no effect on the results and findings. 
However, this assumption could introduce bias if there are factors that result in 
differences in risk contributions based on which unit’s accident scenario is 
initiated and progresses first. 
4. The consequence models from the SOARCA pilot study are valid. The state-
of-the-art consequence models developed for each of the single-unit accident 




for the consequence models developed for each two-unit accident scenario 
evaluated as part of this research. The technical bases for modeling assumptions 
and parameter values used in the SOARCA pilot study are well-documented and 
have undergone extensive peer review.14-16 However, any bias introduced by 
modeling choices made in the SOARCA pilot study may bias the results of this 
research. 
5. The accident scenarios modeled and evaluated are representative of the 
full spectrum of potential accident scenarios for each NPP site. The safety 
goal QHOs were developed for comparison with safety goal QHO risk metric 
results from full-scope NPP Level 3 PRAs that model a reasonably complete set 
of accident scenarios intended to represent the full spectrum of potential accident 
scenarios. To evaluate the effect of expanding the scope of the safety goal policy 
to include consideration of the risk contribution from multi-unit accident 
scenarios, this analysis assumes that the limited set of single-unit and two-unit 
accident scenarios modeled for each NPP site is representative of the full 
spectrum of potential accident scenarios that could occur at each site with 
respect to their conditional consequence contribution to the safety goal QHO risk 
metrics. This assumption allows for adjusting the results of each accident 
scenario using a frequency adjustment factor to account for the frequency 
contribution to risk from excluded scenarios that belong to representative classes 
to develop an estimate of total accident risk. However, this assumption can lead 
to biased results if there are accident scenarios that are not adequately 
represented by the modeled set—especially if they result in significantly different 




I.G. Analysis Scope 
As stated in Section I.F., the safety goal QHOs were developed for comparison with 
safety goal QHO risk metric results from full-scope NPP Level 3 PRAs that model a 
reasonably complete set of accident scenarios intended to represent the full 
spectrum of potential accident scenarios. A full-scope NPP Level 3 PRA can include 
accident scenarios that: (1) are initiated by internal and external initiating event 
hazards; (2) can occur while the NPP is in different plant operating states (e.g., at-
power, low-power, or shutdown); and (3) involve other major sources of radiological 
materials on the NPP site (e.g., spent fuel pool units or dry cask storage facilities).5 
This research is limited to the set of seven single-unit accident scenarios that were 
modeled and evaluated as part of the SOARCA pilot study and the set of 25 two-unit 
accident scenarios that could be constructed from all possible combinations of these 
single-unit accident scenarios. As a result, the following groups of accident scenarios 
that could potentially be included in a full-scope NPP Level 3 PRA are explicitly 
excluded from the scope of this analysis: 
1. Reactor accident scenarios initiated by deliberate malevolent acts. 
Deliberate malevolent acts include acts of sabotage and terrorist attacks. Reactor 
accident scenarios initiated by these types of acts are typically excluded from full-
scope NPP Level 3 PRAs and are also considered to be beyond the scope of the 
safety goal policy. 
2. Reactor accident scenarios that occur while the reactor is in plant 
operating states other than at-power. These include reactor accident 





3. Accident scenarios involving other major sources of radiological materials 
at the modeled NPP sites. These include accident scenarios involving the spent 
fuel pool units or dry cask storage facilities at each of the modeled NPP sites. 
I.H. Significance of Research and Potential Policy Implications 
This research makes three novel and significant contributions: 
1. It develops efficient methods for estimating the contributions to safety goal QHO 
risk metrics from classes of single-unit and multi-unit accident scenarios using 
realistic consequence models from contemporary state-of-the-art reactor 
consequence analyses that leveraged decades of severe accident research and 
advanced analytical tools. These methods were demonstrated using a two-unit 
case study involving two NPP sites that are considered to be representative of a 
broad class of multi-unit U.S. NPP sites that utilize similar reactor and 
containment designs. 
2. It develops and evaluates state-of-the-art consequence models for concurrent 
multi-unit accident scenarios involving both: (1) simultaneous accidents in 
multiple units; and (2) staggered accidents in which the timing offset between 
concurrent accidents involving multiple co-located units at a shared NPP site is 
varied over a range of plausible alternative values. 
3. It generates new insights about: (1) the relative contributions of single-unit and 
multi-unit accident scenarios to safety goal QHO risk metrics; and (2) the effect 
on safety goal QHO risk metrics and margin to the QHOs if the risk contribution 





Insights derived from this research could be used to inform current USNRC and 
nuclear industry stakeholder deliberations about whether and to what extent the 
existing safety goal policy should be expanded to include consideration of the risk 
contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios. Such an expansion in the scope of 
the safety goal policy could potentially yield different decisions regarding the 
justification of future proposed regulatory actions that aim to further enhance NPP 
safety beyond the level provided by adequate protection and thereby reduce the 
overall residual risk to public health and safety. In particular, this could have 
significant implications for regulatory requirements, policies, or guidance pertaining 
to defense-in-depth elements designed to limit the public health and safety risks due 
to potential accidents involving operating reactor units at multi-unit NPP sites; 
notable examples include: 
1. Design of NPP Structures, Systems, Components (SSCs) and Severe 
Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs) for Multi-Unit NPP Sites. NPPs 
are equipped with SSCs designed to prevent, delay, or limit the amount of 
radiological material released to the surrounding environment⎯and thus limit the 
public health and safety consequences⎯if a severe accident involving core 
damage were to occur. SAMGs provide flexible guidance regarding the use of a 
set of potential accident management strategies designed to stop the 
progression of core damage and to limit the radiological release to the 
environment. 
2. Multi-Unit NPP Siting Requirements. USNRC regulations specify criteria for 
siting nuclear reactors. For multi-unit NPP sites with multiple interconnected 
reactors, these regulations specify that siting requirements shall be based upon 




to the environment simultaneously;19 this implicitly assumes that the 
simultaneous release is a bounding or worst-case scenario, which may not be 
the case for all consequence metrics of interest in NPP siting applications.  
3. Multi-Unit NPP Site Emergency Planning Requirements. USNRC regulations 
require NPP licensees to develop detailed emergency response plans (ERPs) for 
specified emergency planning zones (EPZs) around the NPP site to ensure that 
preplanned protective actions can be taken to adequately protect the public in the 
event of a severe accident.20 In establishing these regulatory requirements, the 
USNRC relied on results from NPP Level 3 PRA and PCA studies that did not 






Chapter II: Background 
II.A. Probabilistic Analysis Techniques for Nuclear Power Plants 
Effectively managing the risk of adverse human health, environmental, and economic 
consequences posed by possible nuclear accident scenarios first requires accurate 
identification and assessment of these risks. PRA is a subset of risk analysis 
techniques commonly used to support risk management or safety-related decisions 
involving complex engineered systems. The traditional scenario-based approach to 
PRA involves systematic application of methods, models, data, and analytic tools to 
develop answers to three fundamental questions that underlie a widely accepted 
quantitative definition of risk:4 
1. "What can go wrong?" To answer this question, analysts identify a set of 
hazards that pose a threat to the modeled system or its environment and develop 
a set of possible accident scenarios. Each accident scenario begins with an 
initiating event that causes the system to deviate from its intended operating 
state and challenges mitigating systems, and ends with an adverse outcome or 
end state of interest. Within each scenario, there can be multiple intermediate 
events⎯such as successes or failures of engineered safety features or human 
actions⎯that determine whether and how an initiating event leads to a particular 
end state.  
2. "How likely is it to occur?" To answer this question, analysts estimate the 
likelihood of each accident scenario using its initiating event frequency and the 
conditional probabilities of different combinations of intermediate events that can 
lead from the initiating event to a particular end state, assuming the initiating 




3. "If it does occur, what are the consequences?" To answer this question, 
analysts estimate the conditional consequences resulting from each accident 
scenario, assuming it occurs. This requires specification and estimation of 
consequence measures that represent the level of damage or loss that can occur 
in terms of the adverse outcomes of interest. In general, there are four major 
categories of consequence measures, organized by the type of adverse outcome 
they are designed to measure: (1) dose levels resulting from population exposure 
to harmful agents—including ionizing radiation; (2) adverse human health effects 
resulting from exposure to harmful agents; (3) adverse environmental impacts; 
and (4) economic damages or financial loss. 
The risk triplet comprised of an accident scenario, its frequency, and its conditional 
consequences represents the risk attributed to a particular class of scenarios. In this 
traditional scenario-based PRA framework, the ordered set of risk triplets that 
encompasses a reasonably complete spectrum of possible accident scenarios that 
can occur is assumed to represent the total risk attributed to postulated accidents 
caused by failures within the modeled system. 
PRA has been used primarily as a decision support tool to inform risk management 
or safety-related decisions involving complex engineered systems. In particular, PRA 
has been successfully applied to a vast array of technological systems to: (1) identify 
vulnerabilities and interdependencies in system design and performance that 
increase the risk of system failures; (2) characterize the risk of adverse human 
health, environmental, and economic consequences attributable to possible system 
failures and accidents; (3) identify and characterize significant contributors to risk; (4) 
characterize the relative effectiveness of alternative actions or system configurations 




reduction measures or safety enhancements.21,22 In this way, PRA has provided 
valuable insights that⎯together with other analytic techniques⎯result in better-
informed risk management or safety-related decisions involving complex engineered 
systems. 
Within this scenario-based approach to PRA, risk can be characterized in many 
ways, depending on the end states of interest for a particular decision or application. 
To provide some overall logic and structure and to facilitate evaluation of 
intermediate results, PRAs for NPPs have traditionally been organized into three 
analysis levels, with the scope and level of complexity of the PRA model increasing 
with each level. These levels are defined by three sequential adverse end states that 
can occur in the progression of postulated NPP accident scenarios: (1) onset of core 
damage; (2) release of radioactive materials from the NPP containment structure to 
the surrounding environment (termed “radiological release”); and (3) adverse human 
health, environmental, and economic consequences that occur beyond the boundary 
of the NPP site (commonly grouped into the broad term "offsite radiological 
consequences”).5 
Figure 4 illustrates the overall logic and structure of traditional NPP PRA models, 
including the types of results that are produced at each level. As shown, the end 
state of interest for a Level 1 PRA is core damage. A Level 1 PRA model therefore 
estimates core damage frequency (CDF) using linked event tree and fault tree logic 
models that represent initiating events and response of mitigating systems. The end 
state of interest for a Level 2 PRA is radiological release. A Level 2 PRA model 
therefore expands upon a Level 1 PRA model by adding severe accident 
phenomenological models and logic models that represent containment systems 




characteristics of the released radioactive material (commonly referred to as the 
"source term”). Finally, the end states of interest for a Level 3 PRA are various offsite 
radiological consequences. A Level 3 PRA model therefore expands upon a Level 2 
PRA model by adding a PCA element to quantify conditional measures of the offsite 
radiological health, environmental, and economic consequences, conditioned on the 
occurrence of each postulated radiological release category and its representative 
source term that provides input to the offsite radiological consequence model.5 
 
Figure 4. Overall Logic and Structure of Traditional NPP PRA Models. NPP PRA models 
have traditionally been organized into three analysis levels, with the scope and level of 
complexity of the PRA model increasing with each level. These levels are defined by three 
sequential adverse end states that can occur in the progression of postulated NPP accident 
scenarios: (1) core damage, (2) radiological release, and (3) offsite radiological 
consequences. 
In NPP Level 3 PRAs, the output of PRA logic models that estimate the frequencies 
of a representative set of radiological release categories intended to capture a 
reasonably complete spectrum of possible accident scenarios is combined with the 




frequency-weighted mean consequences are then summed across all radiological 
release categories to estimate the mean annual risk of that outcome. In addition to 
the mean risk of each consequence metric, other quantitative and graphical methods 
are commonly used to characterize the public risk attributable to nuclear accidents. 
Notable examples include: (1) probabilistic summary measures for consequence 
metric distributions (e.g., 95th and 5th percentiles); and (2) complementary 
cumulative distribution function (CCDF) curves (also termed “exceedance frequency 
curves,” “risk curves,” or “risk profiles”) that illustrate the probability or frequency of 
exceeding specified consequence levels.5 
Whether performed as part of a NPP Level 3 PRA, or independently for another 
purpose, PCAs are typically used to assess the offsite radiological consequences of 
severe or beyond-design-basis accidents (BDBAs).k Applications of PCA at the 
USNRC include: (1) regulatory analyses2,3 and backfitl analyses24 to support 
decisions regarding proposed regulatory actions; (2) environmental assessment 
reviews with respect to severe accidents and Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives 
(SAMA) analyses for operating power reactor license renewal25 or Severe Accident 
Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDA) analyses for new power reactor design 
                                                
k The USNRC defines a design-basis accident (DBA) as: “a postulated accident that a 
nuclear facility must be designed and built to withstand without loss to the systems, 
structures, and components necessary to ensure public health and safety” 
(http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/design-basis-accident.html). Beyond-
design-basis accidents (BDBAs) are defined as: “accident sequences that are possible but 
were not fully considered in the design process because they were judged to be too unlikely.” 
BDBAs are thus considered to be beyond the scope of DBAs that a nuclear facility must be 
designed and built to withstand (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/beyond-
design-basis-accidents.html). 
l A backfit is a generic or plant-specific modification that becomes effective after specified 
dates. Examples of backfits include modification of or addition to: (1) facility SSCs or design; 
(2) the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or (3) the procedures or 
organization required to design, construct or operate a facility. Any of these modifications or 
additions may result from a new or amended provision in USNRC regulations or the 
imposition of a regulatory staff position interpreting USNRC regulations that is either new or 




stage applications;26 and (3) supporting applied research studies⎯including the 
SOARCA project,14-16 which developed much of the technical basis for the state-of-
the-art consequence models used in this research. 
II.B. USNRC Safety Goal Policy Statement 
A natural question that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s as some of the 
earliest NPP Level 3 PRAs were being completed⎯and as the USNRC and nuclear 
industry were responding to the accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Station⎯was how to interpret the results from these PRAs and determine whether 
they are acceptable. The USNRC’s approach to addressing this question was to 
develop a safety goal policy. There is a rich history associated with the genesis, 
development, evaluation, and implementation of the USNRC policy statement on 
safety goals for NPP operations. Since this has been well documented in many 
accessible sources,1,7,27,28 the background discussion provided here is relatively brief 
and focuses on the essential issues that are germane to this research. 
The USNRCm derives its statutory responsibilities and authorities from the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA).30 AEA provisions contain an “adequate 
protection standard” that represents a minimum safety standard the USNRC is 
required to satisfy. Under this standard, the USNRC must⎯at a minimum⎯ensure 
the health and safety of the public are adequately protected in executing its statutory 
                                                
m The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was an independent agency in the federal 
executive branch that preceded the USNRC. Under the original Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
the AEC was responsible for two basic functions: (1) the promotion and development of 
commercial uses of nuclear materials; and (2) the licensing and regulation of commercial 
uses of nuclear materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety. Amidst 
growing public concerns about an inherent conflict of interest between these dual functions of 
the AEC, Congress enacted legislation to officially separate them. The Energy 
Reorganization Act of 197429 abolished the AEC and created two new agencies: (1) the 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), now the U.S. Department of 
Energy (DOE), which was assigned the AEC's promotion and development functions; and (2) 




functions. With respect to risk, achieving adequate protection means NPPs must 
pose "no undue risk" (not zero risk) to public health and safety; this means adequate 
protection can be achieved with some level of residual risk to the public.24 However, 
the AEA also includes provisions (primarily in Section 161) containing language that 
allows the USNRC to “govern...as the Commission may deem necessary or 
desirable to...protect health or to minimize danger to life.”30 These provisions: (1) 
suggest that Congress has granted the USNRC broad discretionary authority to take 
actions that go beyond ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety in 
executing its statutory functions; and (2) provide the basis for imposing additional 
safety enhancements that aim to further reduce the residual risk to the public. 
Moreover, this view has been further supported by Federal court decisions involving 
relevant case law in which the courts evaluated both language in AEA provisions and 
the legislative history to determine Congressional intent in establishing the USNRC’s 
statutory mandate.24 
The adequacy of public protection from the risks of accidents involving operating 
reactor units at NPP sites has been debated for many years. The USNRC has 
historically applied the adequate protection standard in a qualitative manner, relying 
primarily on established engineering principles and sound technical judgment. In a 
broad sense, reasonable assurance that the public will be adequately protected from 
the risks of NPP operations is provided through demonstrating compliance with the 
collective body of USNRC regulatory requirements that specify conditions that must 
be met to receive a construction permit and a license to operate an NPP. 
The USNRC developed and evaluated safety goals in response to contentious 
debates among diverse stakeholder groups about the adequacy of NPP safety 




while some stakeholders believed additional regulatory requirements should be 
imposed to further improve NPP safety, others held that the costs of such actions 
would not be justified in light of what they perceived to be relatively low levels of 
residual risk from NPP accidents. In its final report, a Presidential commission 
appointed to investigate the accident urged the USNRC to state its position on this 
controversial issue.31 In response, the USNRC declared that it was prepared to move 
forward with an explicit statement of policy with respect to its safety philosophy and 
the role of safety-cost tradeoffs in USNRC safety decisions, and thus began its 
program to develop safety goals.1 The final safety goal policy statement represents 
the product of this multi-year effort that included: (1) development of draft policy 
documents for stakeholder review and comment; (2) public workshops involving 
participants that represented diverse stakeholder groups;n and (3) a two-year trial-
use and evaluation period that resulted in some substantive policy changes before 
final publication and implementation. 
The USNRC safety goal policy broadly defines an acceptable level of radiological 
risk to public health and safety from potential accidental releases of radiological 
materials from operating power reactors at NPP sites.o The safety goal policy 
                                                
n Examples of stakeholder groups that were represented in the public workshops included: (1) 
public and environmental interest groups; (2) academic researchers and practitioners from 
multiple scientific disciplines that had previously contributed to the literature on the topic of 
acceptable risk, including the social sciences; (3) nuclear utilities and industry advocacy 
groups; (4) technical experts from the USNRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 
(ACRS); and (5) USNRC technical staff members, managers, and policymakers. 
o The scope of the USNRC safety goal policy includes risks to the public arising from both 
routine and accidental radiological releases from operating power reactors at commercial 
NPPs. The USNRC excluded public risks imposed by the nuclear fuel cycle based on earlier 
assessments that suggested fuel cycle risks were relatively small in comparison to operating 
power reactor risks. In addition, environmental impact assessments performed before 
existing NPPs had been licensed to operate indicated there would be no measurable 
radiological impact on members of the public from routine operations. Moreover, since 
compliance with Federal Radiation Council guidance and USNRC regulations was believed to 
ensure that public risks arising from routine emissions were comparatively small, the USNRC 




communicates one aspect of the USNRC’s risk management philosophy; it reflects a 
value judgment that essentially addresses the question “How safe is safe enough?” 
for regulatory decisions regarding NPP safety. In practice, it guides agency 
evaluations to determine whether proposed regulatory actions that would impose 
additional requirements to enhance NPP safety beyond those needed to ensure 
adequate protection are justified based on their potential safety benefit, relative to 
the level of residual risk to the public. Using this approach, proposed regulatory 
actions that aim to enhance NPP safety can be rejected—even if potentially cost-
beneficial—because the level of residual risk to the public is acceptably low, and 
limited resources could thus be better applied to alternative courses of action. The 
concept of opportunity cost from microeconomic theory supports this reasoning. In 
particular, since society has finite resources to expend on safety enhancements, 
excessive spending to reduce health and safety risks attributed to the nuclear 
industry could potentially increase net public risk by diverting scarce safety resources 
from application to potentially more cost-beneficial uses. 
The safety goal policy is based on a hierarchical framework comprised of two high-
level qualitative safety goals supported by two lower-level QHOs that can be used to 
determine whether and to what extent each qualitative safety goal has been 
achieved. The first qualitative safety goal addresses risks to individual members of 
the public and is supported by the early fatality risk QHO. The second qualitative 
safety goal is intended to address societal risk and is supported by the latent cancer 
fatality risk QHO. Figure 5 illustrates this hierarchical framework, while Table I 
provides the exact language used to specify the qualitative safety goals and 
                                                                                                                                      
demonstrate conformance with the safety goal policy.1 This research therefore focuses only 
on the application of USNRC safety goals in the context of public risks arising from potential 





supporting QHOs in the USNRC Safety Goal Policy Statement.1 
 
Figure 5. Hierarchical Framework of the USNRC Safety Goal Policy. The USNRC safety 
goal policy is based on a hierarchical framework comprised of two high-level qualitative 
safety goals supported by two lower-level QHOs that can be used to determine whether and 
to what extent each qualitative safety goal has been achieved. 
The safety goals and QHOs are primarily used in the evaluation of proposed 
regulatory actions as part of regulatory or backfit analyses. The primary decision 
analysis technique used to evaluate alternatives in these analyses is cost-benefit 
analysis. The principal metric calculated in these cost-benefit analyses to support 
decisionmaking is the net present value of net benefits (net value), which represents 
the difference between the sum of monetized and discounted benefits and the sum 
of monetized and discounted costs.2,3 
However, results from NPP Level 3 PRAs or PCAs can be used to evaluate and 
screen proposed alternatives based on the magnitude of the estimated safety benefit 
relative to the level of residual risk to the public, before detailed cost-benefit analyses 




guidance for performing an evaluation of proposed regulatory actions with respect to 
the USNRC safety goals. This safety goal evaluation is designed to identify when a 
regulatory requirement should not be imposed generically on NPPs because the 
residual risk to the public is already acceptably low; it is intended to eliminate some 
proposed regulatory actions from further consideration, regardless of whether they 
could be justified on the basis of their net value. This safety goal evaluation can also 
be used to determine whether a proposed generic safety enhancement backfit that 
does not meet certain exemption criteria provides a substantial increase in the 
overall protection of public health and safety to warrant further evaluation of the 
benefits and costs to determine whether they are justified on their net value basis.2,3 
USNRC regulatory analysis guidelines include explicit safety goal screening criteria 
related to: (1) changes in CDF, and (2) conditional containment failure probabilities. 
These criteria—which are intended to provide a balanced consideration of measures 
to prevent and mitigate core damage accidents—can be used to evaluate results 
from Level 1 and Level 2 NPP PRAs to determine conformity with subsidiary safety 
goal objectives based on CDF and large early release frequency (LERF). Although 
these guidelines do not include explicit screening criteria related to the early fatality 
risk and latent cancer fatality risk QHOs, corresponding results from NPP Level 3 
PRAs for these metrics can be used to evaluate proposed regulatory actions with 
respect to the safety goals.2,3 
For those proposed regulatory actions that pass the safety goal screening 
evaluation, a detailed cost-benefit analysis is performed to estimate the net value. 
The principal outputs from a NPP Level 3 PRA or PCA that serve as inputs to the 
cost-benefit analysis are: (1) averted population dose—which is monetized using a 




is averted; and (2) averted economic costs, including offsite property damage.2,3 
Importantly, during development and evaluation of the safety goal policy, the USNRC 
decided that the safety goals and QHOs would be applied strictly on a per-reactor-
unit basis, even for the multi-unit sites that comprise nearly 60% of the operating 
U.S. NPP sites; the rationale for this decision was to avoid imposing a regulatory 
bias against multi-unit sites that may be subject to stricter requirements if the safety 
goals and QHOs were to be applied on a per-site basis.7 As a result, accident 
scenarios involving concurrent radiological releases from multiple co-located 
operating reactor units have—with few exceptions—traditionally been excluded from 
NPP PRAs and safety goal evaluations as part of regulatory or backfit analyses for 
proposed regulatory actions. 
This existing gap in the scope and application of the safety goal policy can have 
important implications. In particular, since multi-unit accident scenarios are excluded 
from the scope of NPP PRAs and supporting PCAs, the true total accident risk for 
reactor units that are co-located with other units at multi-unit NPP sites may be 
underestimated. As a result, safety goal evaluations of proposed regulatory actions 
that aim to further enhance NPP safety beyond the level provided by adequate 
protection—and thereby reduce the overall residual risk to public health and safety 
from NPP accidents—may conclude that these proposed actions would not be 
justified based on a low level of residual risk to the public. These proposed actions 
would therefore be rejected before detailed cost-benefit analyses would be 
performed to determine whether this subset of decision analysis techniques indicate 




II.C. Concurrent Accidents Involving Multiple Operating Reactor Units 
Co-located at a Shared Site 
II.C.1. Results and Insights from Previous Multi-Unit Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments: The Seabrook Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
While most PRAs for multi-unit NPP sites have been performed on a per-reactor-unit 
basis—assuming all other operating reactor units co-located at a shared NPP site 
are in a safe and stable condition—some previous NPP PRAs have considered the 
possibility of concurrent accidents involving multi-unit releases. A notable example is 
the Seabrook Station Level 3 PRA that was completed in 1983 to address potential 
emergency planning issues for what was then planned to be a two-unit NPP site.8 
In the Seabrook study, initiating events were organized into three categories: (1) 
those that would always impact both units; (2) those that would impact both units 
only under certain conditions; and (3) those that would impact each unit 
independently. The frequency of two-unit core damage and radiological release 
events was estimated by: (1) adjusting the frequency basis for initiating events from 
events per reactor-year to events per site-year for the two-unit NPP site; (2) 
developing a simplified logic model that included events involving both units; and (3) 
using an adaptation of the beta-factor method for treatment of common-cause failure 
(CCF) events32 involving SSCs in both units. The conditional consequences of the 
two-unit radiological release events were estimated by: (1) assuming the two-unit 
releases would occur simultaneously; and (2) using frequency adjustment factors to 
adjust either the source term parameters or the conditional consequence estimates 





Under these assumptions, the Seabrook study demonstrated that—while single-unit 
accident scenarios provided the greatest contribution to total site risk with respect to 
both early fatalities and latent cancer fatalities—there were two important findings 
with respect to two-unit accident scenarios: (1) the two-unit accident scenarios were 
the dominant contributor to accidents with the greatest consequences in the extreme 
tails of the CCDF curves; and (2) even for a NPP site with limited sharing of SSCs, 
two-unit accident scenarios provided a non-negligible contribution of 7% to the total 
site CDF. For the latter finding, it was further estimated that the conditional 
probability of occurrence for a two-unit core damage accident, given that a core 
damage accident had occurred in either unit, was 14%.8 
Together with findings from other studies that included a limited treatment of multi-
unit accident scenarios, these findings suggest that the contribution to total site 
accident risk from multi-unit accident scenarios is not negligible and could be 
significant, depending on site-specific factors that influence the potential for 
dependent failure events or adverse interactions across multiple units. 
II.C.2. Insights from Reviews of U.S. Operating Experience and LER Data 
Under existing USNRC regulations, licensees are required to submit an LER to the 
USNRC within a specified time period after abnormal conditionsp are observed at a 
licensed NPP. These LERs identify and describe the apparent root causes of the 
abnormal conditions, as well as actions the licensee will take to resolve the issue(s). 
Although the USNRC does not specifically record, analyze, and report events 
involving multiple units at NPP sites, some reports in the USNRC LER database 
include information about such multi-unit events. A recent study showed that 9% 
                                                
p Abnormal conditions are those that are beyond the technical specifications that define the 




(391 out of 4207) of LERs reported to the USNRC from 2000 through 2011 affected 
multiple units at a shared NPP site.12,13 This study also included examples of the 
types of multi-unit dependencies associated with these events, as well as summaries 
of the USNRC’s evaluation of the significance of selected multi-unit events. 
From this research, a classification scheme was developed to characterize potential 
dependencies across multiple units so that multiple, independent single-unit PRA 
models could to be integrated into a single multi-unit PRA model for a shared NPP 
site. Six categories of multi-unit dependencies were identified and developed: (1) 
initiating events; (2) shared connections; (3) identical components; (4) proximity 
dependencies; (5) human dependencies; and (6) organizational dependencies.12,13 
Among other findings, this research demonstrated that adverse events involving 
multiple operating reactor units co-located at a shared NPP site can and do occur at 
a non-negligible frequency. 
II.C.3. The 2011 Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station: A 
Salient Example of Potential Multi-Unit Accident Scenarios 
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan (Tohoku) Earthquake—one of the most 
powerful earthquakes in recorded history—occurred off the northeast coast of Japan. 
This magnitude 9.0-earthquake caused seafloor deformation that triggered a 
devastating tsunami that flooded about a 2000-kilometer segment of the Japan coast 
with inundation heights of up to 40 meters, and injured or killed approximately 25,000 
people.11 
Flooding caused by the earthquake-induced tsunami set in motion a cascade of 
events that culminated in severe damage to multiple operating reactor units at the 




2, and 3) were operating at their full rated power level; the remaining three reactors 
(Units 4, 5, and 6) were in outages for refueling, maintenance, or inspection 
activities. All three operating reactors automatically shut down when the earthquake 
occurred. Although the earthquake caused a loss of offsite power (LOOP) initiating 
event at the FDNPS, onsite emergency diesel generators (EDGs) initially started and 
ran successfully to supply backup power to safety-critical SSCs. However, the 
subsequent tsunami eventually flooded EDG intakes, causing the EDGs to fail.9-11 
This combination of a LOOP caused by the earthquake and subsequent failure of the 
EDGs caused by tsunami-induced flooding resulted in a loss of all electrical power to 
safety-critical SSCs—a scenario that is commonly referred to as a "station blackout” 
(SBO). In the subsequent 72 hours, the operating reactors melted down, releasing 
hydrogen and radioactive materials into the surrounding containments. Subsequent 
hydrogen explosions in the containment buildings caused severe structural damage, 
resulting in prolonged releases of very large amounts of radioactive materials into the 
surrounding environment.9-11 
The 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident has been rated as one of the worst nuclear 
accidents in history. Along with the 1986 nuclear accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear 
Power Station, it is only one of two nuclear accidents to be assigned the worst 
possible rating on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES). 
The INES scale was developed to facilitate understanding of and communication 
about the safety significance of events involving various sources of radiation, 
including NPPs. Safety significant events involving nuclear or radiological materials 
are classified on the INES scale at one of seven levels: Levels 1-3 are categorized 
as “incidents” and Levels 4-7 are categorized as “accidents.” Events without safety 





Using the INES scale, events are classified based on their impact on three broad 
areas: (1) people and the environment; (2) radiological barriers and controls at 
affected facilities; and (3) defense-in-depth considerations.33 Similar to the Richter 
scale for earthquakes, the INES scale is logarithmic; each increase in INES level is 
intended to represent an order of magnitude increase in the severity of the event 
consequences. 
The Fukushima nuclear accident was assigned the highest possible rating of Level 7, 
which is a “major accident” characterized by a “major release of radioactive material 
with widespread health and environmental effects requiring implementation of 
planned and extended countermeasures.”11,33 Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident was the only nuclear accident to receive an INES rating of Level 7. 
33 By comparison, the 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2—
which resulted in severe damage to the reactor core, but only a minor release of 
radioactive material beyond its containment structure—was assigned an INES rating 
of Level 5, which is characterized as an “accident with wider consequences.”33 
The 2011 accident at the FDNPS provides a salient example of potential multi-unit 
accident scenarios. It challenged many assumptions that had been used in previous 
PRA and PCA studies and underscored the importance of many factors affecting the 
initiation, progression, and consequences of potential multi-unit accident scenarios; 
examples include: (1) dependencies or interactions across multiple co-located units 
at a shared NPP site—especially those influenced by large-scale external events; (2) 
differences in accident progression timelines across multiple units, resulting in 




conditions over time and the need to account for the effects of changes in wind 
direction on atmospheric transport and dispersion; and (4) while not addressed as 
part of this research, the potential for multi-unit accident scenarios that include spent 
fuel pool units co-located with reactor units at a shared NPP site. 
II.D. The State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) 
Project 
II.D.1. Project Overview 
In 2005—six years before the occurrence of the 2011 nuclear accident at the 
FDNPS—the USNRC initiated the SOARCA project to: (1) develop integrated state-
of-the-art reactor accident progression and offsite radiological consequence models 
that leveraged the enhanced state of knowledge about severe accident phenomena 
and radiological health effects developed over decades of research, and modeled 
improvements in NPP design and operation that had not been reflected in earlier 
studies; and (2) obtain realistic estimates of the public health outcomes for select 
single-unit accident scenarios that were judged to be important based on their 
contribution to CDF or their potential to cause offsite radiological health 
consequences.14-16 
This research builds upon the state-of-the-art offsite radiological consequence 
models that were developed as part of the initial pilot study for the SOARCA project, 
and therefore relies heavily on its underlying technical basis for model and parameter 
value selection. This section will therefore describe in some detail the objectives, 
study design, consideration of multi-unit events, and conclusions for the SOARCA 




II.D.2. Project Objectives 
The overall objective of the SOARCA project was to develop an updated body of 
knowledge regarding the realistic outcomes for important severe reactor accidents. 
This overall objective was complemented by a number of supporting objectives; two 
of these that directly pertain to this research include:14-16 
1. Incorporate integrated modeling of severe accident progression and offsite 
consequences using state-of-the-art analytical tools. Leverage the enhanced 
state of knowledge about severe accident phenomena and radiological health 
effects that had been developed over the course of several decades of research. 
2. Model modifications to NPP design and operation that were not reflected in 
previous PRA or PCA studies. Examples of these changes included: (1) 
system design enhancements; (2) improved training, emergency operating 
procedures (EOPs), and ERPs; and (3) Extensive Damage Mitigation Guideline 
(EDMG) measures implemented following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 to improve each NPP’s capability to mitigate events involving loss of large 
areas caused by fires or explosions.34 
II.D.3. Pilot Study Design 
Two representative NPP sites using the traditional large light-water reactor (LWR) 
design were selected for an initial pilot study. The NPP sites evaluated in the 
SOARCA pilot study were: (1) Peach Bottom, Unit 2—located approximately 18 
miles south of Lancaster, PA; and (2) Surry, Unit 1—located approximately 17 miles 
northwest of Newport News, VA. Peach Bottom is generally representative of U.S. 
operating reactors using the General Electric boiling-water reactor (BWR) design 




reactors using the Westinghouse pressurized-water reactor (PWR) design with a 
large, dry containment. 
Accident scenarios were selected for detailed modeling and evaluation using a 
rigorous process that coupled results and insights from available PRA models for 
each site with expert judgments about the relative importance of each scenario. To 
focus study resources, criteria were developed to identify the most important 
accident scenarios based on two factors: (1) their likelihood of causing core 
damage—which was assessed using their contribution to CDF; and (2) their potential 
for causing significant offsite radiological health consequences due to an early failure 
or bypass of the containment structure. In particular, accident scenarios were 
selected for inclusion in the SOARCA pilot study if: (1) their CDF contribution was 
equal to or greater than 1E-06 per reactor-year; or (2) they involved early failure or 
bypass of containment and their CDF contribution was equal to or greater than 1E-07 
per reactor-year.14-16 Using this approach, seven single-unit accident scenarios were 
selected for detailed modeling and evaluation under the SOARCA pilot study. These 
accident scenarios are summarized in Tables II and III. 
To assess the potential benefits of EDMGs and to provide a basis for comparison to 
the previous analyses of unmitigated severe accident scenarios, the SOARCA pilot 
study analyzed each scenario with and without crediting EDMG equipment and 
procedures. The analysis that credits successful implementation of the mitigation 
measures—in addition to actions directed by the EOPs and SAMGs—is referred to 
as the “mitigated case”. The analysis that does not credit these mitigation measures 
is referred to as the “unmitigated case.”14-16 Since a formal human reliability analysis 
(HRA) was not performed to quantify human error probabilities (HEPs) for the 




used for the purposes of this research. 
II.D.4. Consideration of Multi-Unit Events 
Both Peach Bottom and Surry are multi-unit NPP sites, each comprised of two 
operating reactor units at a shared site. During the accident scenario identification 
and selection process described above, analysts identified potential scenarios in 
which both units at each NPP site could concurrently experience initiating events and 
subsequent event sequences that lead to concurrent core damage.  
Although the CDF contribution from these multi-unit accident scenarios was in the 
range of the 1E-06 per reactor-year inclusion criterion, treatment of these scenarios 
was determined to be beyond the scope of the SOARCA pilot study. Instead, the 
issue of potential multi-unit core damage accident scenarios was proposed as a 
safety-related generic issue and referred for further evaluation because it was 
recognized that such accident scenarios may: (1) challenge the ability of the NPP 
operating personnel to respond and may require resources beyond those that are 
available for single-unit accident scenarios; and (2) increase the amount of 
radiological material released to the environment and the subsequent offsite 
radiological consequences. However, a screening panel later recommended that the 
issue not be treated as part of the Generic Issues Program. This recommendation 
was based on: (1) the results of a scoping analysis that aimed to develop a bounding 
estimate of multi-unit risk using results from single-unit PRAs—which suggested that 
the issue was of low risk significance to public health and safety; and (2) the need for 
longer term efforts to develop analytical tools that could more accurately estimate the 




II.D.5. Pilot Study Conclusions 
Based on the results from the integrated state-of-the-art accident progression and 
offsite radiological consequence models for Peach Bottom and Surry, the SOARCA 
pilot study yielded a number of key conclusions:14-16 
1. When operators are successful in using available onsite equipment during the 
modeled accident scenarios, they can prevent reactor core damage or delay or 
reduce radiological releases to the environment. 
2. For all modeled accident scenarios—whether mitigated or unmitigated—
accidents progress more slowly and release much smaller amounts of 
radiological material than estimated in previous PRA and PCA studies. 
3. Delays in estimated radiological releases provide more time for implementing 
offsite emergency response actions. If ERPs are implemented as planned and 
practiced, offsite emergency response actions reduce the risk of radiological 
health consequences attributed to modeled accident scenarios. 
4. For all modeled severe accident scenarios—whether mitigated or unmitigated—
there is essentially no risk of early fatalities during or shortly after the accident. 
5. Latent cancer fatality risks attributed to the modeled accident scenarios are 
millions of times lower than the background cancer fatality risk for the general 
U.S. population. 
Although these findings are based on a limited set of accident scenarios that were 
analyzed using site-specific models for the Peach Bottom and Surry NPP sites, they 
may be generally applicable to NPPs with similar designs. Additional studies 




insights derived from the SOARCA pilot study and to assess their applicability to 
other reactor-containment designs and NPP sites. 
II.D.6. SOARCA Uncertainty Analysis 
Uncertainty analyses are being performed for specific accident scenarios that were 
evaluated as part of the SOARCA pilot study. These analyses are conditioned on the 
assumed occurrence of specified conditions in the progression of the modeled 
accident scenarios. There are three high-level objectives for these conditional 
uncertainty analyses: (1) develop insights into the overall sensitivity of SOARCA 
results to uncertainty in inputs; (2) identify the most influential input parameters for 
accidental radiological releases and accident consequences; and (3) demonstrate 
the application of an uncertainty analysis methodology that could be used in future 
source term, PCA, or NPP Level 3 PRA studies.36 
The uncertainty analyses involve varying multiple uncertain model parameters using 
Monte Carlo sampling of parameter probability distributions. Subject matter experts 
were consulted to determine the most important uncertain parameters in accident 
progression, radiological release, and offsite radiological consequence models for 
variation. Multiple statistical regression techniques are then used to quantify 
uncertainty and to determine which parameters have the greatest influence on the 
results.36 
II.D.7. SOARCA Study for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 
A follow-on SOARCA study was initiated to develop best estimates of the offsite 
radiological health consequences for select accident scenarios involving the 
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant—which uses a PWR design with an ice condenser 




containment, which is smaller than the large, dry containment used with other PWR 
NPPs, including Surry.37 
The Sequoyah SOARCA study is applying modeling lessons learned and best 
practices from the SOARCA pilot study.38,39 In addition, the effects of using diverse 
and flexible coping strategies involving portable equipment—which the U.S. nuclear 
industry implemented in response to challenges identified by the 2011 accident at 





Chapter III: Methods and Analytical Tools 
III.A. Methods for Estimating Contribution to Safety Goal QHO Risk 
Metrics from Modeled Single-Unit and Two-Unit Accident Scenarios 
III.A.1. Overview 
The safety goal QHOs were developed for comparison with safety goal QHO risk 
metric results from full-scope NPP Level 3 PRAs that model a reasonably complete 
set of accident scenarios intended to represent the full spectrum of potential accident 
scenarios. The SOARCA pilot study14-16 used state-of-the-art methods, models, data, 
and analytical tools to develop more realistic estimates of the offsite radiological 
consequences attributed to nuclear accident scenarios. To leverage the advanced 
models, results, and insights that were developed as part of this effort, this 
contemporary study was selected as the foundation to build upon for this research. 
However, the SOARCA pilot study was not a full-scope NPP Level 3 PRA; it was a 
limited-scope PCA study that performed detailed modeling and integrated analysis of 
accident progression and offsite consequences for a small set of single-unit accident 
scenarios that were judged to be important. 
To perform an adequate evaluation of the effect of expanding the scope of the safety 
goal policy to include the contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios to safety 
goal QHO risk metrics thus required development of novel methods for: (1) 
converting the single-unit accident scenario frequencies and consequences from the 
SOARCA pilot study to representative single-unit accident risk results for each NPP 
site; (2) estimating frequencies for all modeled two-unit accident scenarios; (3) 
implementing the new multi-source model in MACCS to estimate the conditional 




accident scenarios under base case and sensitivity analysis assumptions; (4) 
converting the two-unit accident scenario frequencies and conditional consequences 
estimated as part of this research to representative two-unit accident risk results; and 
(5) estimating the figures of merit used to evaluate the effect of this expansion in 
scope of the safety goal policy. 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 respectively illustrate the process used to implement a novel 
approach that was developed for estimating the contributions to safety goal QHO risk 
metrics from single-unit accident scenarios, from multi-unit accident scenarios, and 
the figures of merit. More detailed descriptions about the process steps, equations, 
variables, and data sources that correspond to each figure are provided in the 
following subsections. Although these figures and descriptions focus on the case 
study application of this process to representative two-unit NPP sites, some ideas 
regarding how this approach could be generalized and applied to NPP sites with 
differing numbers of units are provided in Section III.C. 
III.A.2. Estimation of the Contribution from Single-Unit Accidents to Safety 
Goal QHO Risk Metrics (Figure 6) 
Step 1, Step 2a, and Step 2b. These steps respectively involve: (1) selecting and 
modeling single-unit accident scenarios judged to be important to risk; (2a) 
estimating their corresponding frequencies; and (2b) estimating their conditional 
consequences—in this case, conditional consequence metrics that provide input to 
the risk metrics for comparison to the early fatality risk and latent cancer fatality risk 
QHOs. For this research, all of these steps were accomplished as part of the 
SOARCA pilot study that provides much of the underlying technical basis for the 





Figure 6. Process for Estimating the Contribution from Single-Unit Accidents to Safety 
Goal QHO Risk Metrics. A two-unit case is used to demonstrate the process for estimating 
the contribution from single-unit accident scenarios to safety goal QHO risk metrics. 
 
Figure 7. Process for Estimating the Contribution from Multi-Unit Accidents to Safety 
Goal QHO Risk Metrics. A two-unit case is used to demonstrate the process for estimating 






Figure 8. Process for Estimating Figures of Merit for Evaluation of Policy Alternatives. 
A two-unit case is used to demonstrate the process for estimating risk metrics for comparison 
to the safety goal QHOs and the figures of merit for evaluation of policy alternatives. 
Step 3: Estimate unadjusted single-unit accident scenario risk. The unadjusted 
contribution to risk from each single-unit accident scenario i is estimated using 
Equation (1): 
𝑅!! ! = 𝐹!! ∙ 𝐶!!|𝑖   (1) 
• 𝑅!! ! = unadjusted mean risk contribution from single-unit accident scenario i to 
each safety goal QHO risk metric. Unadjusted means the risk contribution has 
not been adjusted to account for the contribution to frequency from other single-
unit accident scenarios in a similar class that scenario i is assumed to represent. 




Estimates for the Peach Bottom and Surry single-unit accident scenario mean 
CDF contributions were provided in the SOARCA pilot study.14-16 
• 𝐶!! 𝑖  = mean value for the single-unit conditional safety goal QHO consequence 
metrics, conditioned on the occurrence of representative single-unit accident 
scenario i. This represents the consequence contribution to the safety goal QHO 
risk metrics from the class of single-unit accidents that scenario i is assumed to 
represent. Estimates of the mean conditional consequences for the Peach 
Bottom and Surry single-unit accident scenarios were calculated in the SOARCA 
pilot study using the MACCS code.14-16 
 
Step 4a: Estimate single-unit frequency adjustment factor. An adjustment factor 
is needed to adjust the single-unit accident scenario risk estimates to account for the 
contribution to the frequency element of the risk triplet from other single-unit accident 
scenarios in each class that have not been modeled and analyzed. This approach 
assumes that each single-unit accident scenario i results in conditional consequence 
distributions that are similar to those that would result from each of the other single-
unit accident scenarios that scenario i is assumed to represent. Moreover, it is 
assumed that a global adjustment factor can be applied to all single-unit accident 
scenarios; this implies that the proportion of single-unit accident scenarios that are 
not modeled is the same for all classes of single-unit accident scenarios that are 












• 𝛼! = global single-unit frequency adjustment factor. 
• 𝐹!"!#$!  = mean total single-unit CDF from all single-unit accident scenarios 
initiated by internal events, fires, and seismic events. Estimates of the single-unit 
CDFs from all three initiating event hazards for Peach Bottom and Surry were 
provided in the NUREG-1150 study41 that documented NPP Level 3 PRAs for 
five U.S. NPP sites. Although these NPP Level 3 PRA studies were completed 
more than 20 years ago, the CDF estimates are still considered among the NPP 
PRA community to be sufficient for analyses such as this for which an order-of-
magnitude estimate of CDF is considered to be sufficient. Moreover, since the 
figures of merit for this evaluation represent relative changes to isolate the effect 
of including the risk contribution from multi-unit accidents, it can be 
mathematically demonstrated that this variable does not influence these figures 
of merit; it only influences that absolute values of the safety goal QHO risk 
metrics and QHO margin. 
• 𝐹!!! = combined frequency of all modeled single-unit accident scenarios that are 
assumed to be representative of the full spectrum of potential single-unit accident 
scenarios. 
Step 4b: Estimate adjusted single-unit accident scenario risk. The adjusted 
contribution to risk from each single-unit accident scenario i is estimated using 
Equation (3): 
𝑅!! = 𝛼! ∙ 𝑅!! !  (3) 
• 𝑅!! = adjusted mean risk contribution to each safety goal QHO risk metric from 




Adjusted means the risk contribution has been adjusted to account for the 
contribution to frequency from other single-unit accident scenarios in the same 
class that are not modeled. 
 
Step 5: Estimate total single-unit accident risk. The total contribution to risk from 
all single-unit accident scenarios is estimated using Equation (4): 
𝑅!"!#$! = 𝑅!!!   (4) 
• 𝑅!"!#$!  = total mean risk contribution to each safety goal QHO metric from all 
single-unit accident scenarios initiated by internal events, fires, and seismic 
events. 
III.A.3. Estimation of the Contribution from Two-Unit Accidents to Safety Goal 
QHO Risk Metrics (Figure 7) 
Step 6: Select and model important two-unit accident scenarios. The process 
used to select the two-unit accident scenarios for modeling and analysis as part of 
this research was described in Section I.E.3. A total of 25 two-unit accident scenarios 
(nine for Peach Bottom and 16 for Surry) were constructed using all possible 
combinations of single-unit accident scenarios that were modeled for each NPP site 
as part of the SOARCA pilot study. 
A description about the process used to model each two-unit accident scenario first 
requires a description about: (1) the MelMACCS interface software utility; (2) the new 
multi-source modeling capability that has been implemented in MACCS; and (3) 
identification of the additional parameters that must be defined to develop a MACCS 




single-unit accident scenario. The technical basis that underlies the 
phenomenological models used in MACCS, as well as information about the 
verification and validation testing that it has undergone, are well documented in 
accessible resources.17,18 
MelMACCS and the MACCS Multi-Source Model 
The USNRC uses the MELCOR code for modeling severe accident progression and 
estimation of source terms.38 Source term information is contained in MELCOR plot 
files (*.ptf) that are processed using the MelMACCS interface software utility to 
extract the data needed for the offsite radiological consequence analysis and to 
generate the corresponding inputs for the MACCS consequence model. 
MACCS was recently enhanced in Version 3.10q to include the capability to model 
releases from multiple, co-located radiological sources with potentially different 
accident progression timelines and unique radionuclide inventories. Figure 9 
provides an overall conceptual model illustrating the relationships between key 
inputs and phenomena modeled in MACCS to calculate conditional consequence 
metrics for two-unit accident scenarios. 
  
                                                
q MACCS Version 3.10 was used to perform all MACCS modeling and simulations in support 






Figure 9. Overall Conceptual Model. A conceptual model illustrates relationships between 
key inputs and phenomena modeled in MACCS to calculate conditional consequence metrics 
for two-unit accident scenarios. 
The new multi-source model is implemented by assigning values to an additional set 
of parameters that completely specify the multi-source model. Table IV summarizes 
these parameters and provides an explanation for how each parameter was treated 
for this research. In practice, once the analyst identifies the MelMACCS-generated 
source term input files that are to be combined within the multi-source model, 
MACCS calculates the values for most parameters based on the number of source 
term input files that are specified and the information they contain with respect to the 
numbers of plume segments and delay times. 
Modeling of Two-Unit Accident Scenarios 
For this research, the only parameter that required a decision about its value was the 
SOURCE TIME OFFSET parameter that defines the timing offset for each of the 
source term input files. Moreover, only the timing offset for the accident in the co-
located unit needed to be defined to fully specify the multi-source model for all two-
accident scenarios. There were two reasons for this: (1) this research assumes that 
one of the single-unit accident scenarios is always considered to be the reference 






































releases—which means the value of SOURCE TIME OFFSET for the reference unit 
accident scenario is always set to 0; and (2) Peach Bottom and Surry are both 
comprised of two operating reactor units—which means the number of source term 
input files for each multi-unit accident scenario is always two, since accidents 
involving spent fuel pool units and dry cask storage facilities are excluded from this 
research (NUM_SOURCES = 2). 
To evaluate the effect of variation in the SOURCE TIME OFFSET parameter on the 
impact of including the contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios to the safety 
goal QHO risk metrics, the following analyses were performed with alternative values 
assigned to the SOURCE TIME OFFSET parameter for the co-located unit: 
1. Base Case Analysis: The value of SOURCE TIME OFFSET was set to 0 to 
model simultaneous concurrent accident scenarios in both the reference unit and 
its co-located unit. 
2. One-Way Sensitivity Analyses: The value of SOURCE TIME OFFSET was 
varied from 1 to 7 days in one-day increments to model and evaluate the effects 
of differences in the timing of accident initiation, progression, and radiological 
releases for the reference unit and co-located unit. This range of plausible values 
was selected because it was judged to provide sufficient results to determine 
whether any patterns or trends emerge.r 
                                                
r A limited set of sensitivity analyses were also performed to evaluate the effect of varying the 
timing offset parameter from 1 to 24 hours in one-hour increments. Only results for one-way 
sensitivity analyses using the 1 to 7 day range in one-day increments are presented for two 
reasons: (1) results did not converge within 24 hours for some two-unit accident scenarios, 
indicating the need to perform sensitivity analyses using timing offsets greater than 24 hours; 





Table IV. Parameters Unique to the MACCS Multi-Source Model 
 
Step 7a: Estimate two-unit accident scenario frequencies. Estimation of two-unit 
accident scenario frequencies requires consideration of three elements: (1) the 
unconditional frequency of the single-unit accident scenario initiated in the reference 
unit (𝐹!!); (2) the conditional probability of an accident occurring in the co-located 
unit, given the reference unit’s accident scenario frequency; and (3) the conditional 
probability of the co-located unit experiencing accident scenario j concurrent with the 
reference unit’s accident scenario, given that single-unit accident scenario i has 
occurred in the reference unit and given that a concurrent accident has occurred in 
the co-located unit. 
Two alternative approaches to estimating the last element were considered. The first 
approach was to assign an equal conditional probability to each of the single-unit 
Lower Limit Upper Limit
TOTREL
Defines number of 
plume segments 
released over all 
files specified for 
multi-source model.
2 500 N/A
Maintained number of plume 
segments defined in each of the 
SOARCA study source term files. 
Multi-source calculates TOTREL by 
summing the number of plume 




name for source 
term input files.
N/A
Defined when multi-source term file 
set specified in MACCS file 
specifications.
PLUME_DLY
Start time of plume 




Maintained plume delay timing 
defined each of the SOARCA study 
source term files.
NUM_SOURCES
Number of source 
term files specified. 
Defined when user 
specifies multi-
source term file set.
2 500 N/A
Defined when multi-source term file 
set is specified in MACCS file 
specifications. Since both Peach 
Bottom and Surry are two-unit sites, 
this study was limited to modeling 
and analyzing multi-source accident 








Time offset for first source term file 
was set to 0 to coincide with modeled 
reference unit accident initiation. 
Time offset for co-located unit source 
term file was set to 0 for the base 
case assumption of simultaneous 
accident scenarios and varied from 1 
to 7 days in one-day increments for 
sensitivity analyses to evaluate 









accident scenarios in the co-located unit that the reference unit accident scenario 
could be combined with. However, this approach was discarded in favor of an 
approach that utilizes important information about the unconditional relative 
likelihoods of each accident scenario. This was judged to be appropriate because 
whether or not a specific accident scenario has occurred in the reference unit, there 
are certain attributes that still make some accident scenarios in the co-located unit 
less likely to occur than others. For example, an ISLOCA scenario for Surry Unit 2 
should still be less likely than the LTSBO scenario, regardless of which single-unit 
accident scenario Surry Unit 1 experienced. Based on the adopted approach, the 
frequency of each two-unit accident scenario is estimated using Equation (5): 






  (5) 
• 𝐹!"!  = mean two-unit CDF contribution from two-unit accident scenario ij. The 
index i is used to represent the single-unit accident scenario that occurs in the 
reference unit, while the index j is used to represent the single-unit accident 
scenario that concurrently occurs in the co-located unit. 
• 𝛽 = global conditional probability of an accident occurring in the co-located unit, 
given that single-unit accidents involving the reference unit occur at a specified 
frequency. For this research, a global average conditional probability is assumed 
to apply across all multi-unit accident scenarios. In reality, each multi-unit 
accident scenario can have a unique conditional probability given the occurrence 
of a specified single-unit accident scenario in the reference unit. For the base 
case analysis, the value of 𝛽 was assumed to be 0.1; this implies a 10% chance 
of the co-located unit experiencing a core damage accident, given that core 




on results and insights from previous multi-unit NPP PRA studies8 and operating 
experience data,12,13 this appeared to be a reasonable assumption. One-way 
sensitivity analyses were then performed to evaluate the effect of varying this 







 = conditional probability of single-unit accident scenario j concurrently 
occurring in the co-located unit, given that single-unit accident scenario i has 
occurred in the reference unit and that a concurrent accident has occurred in the 
co-located unit. This represents the relative contribution of each single-unit 
accident scenario frequency to the combined single-unit accident frequency from 
the set of all modeled single-unit accident scenarios for each NPP site. 
Step 7b: Estimate two-unit accident scenario consequences. The mean values 
for the two-unit conditional consequence contribution to the safety goal QHO risk 
metrics, conditioned on the occurrence of representative two-unit accident scenario ij 
𝐶!"! 𝑖𝑗 , are estimated by implementing the multi-source model in the MACCS code. 
This represents the conditional consequence contribution to the safety goal QHO risk 
metrics from the class of two-unit accidents that two-unit accident scenario ij 
represents. 
MACCS Output Options for Estimating Conditional Consequence Contribution 
to Safety Goal QHO Risk Metrics 
MACCS has the ability to calculate and report two different consequence metrics that 
can be used to estimate the conditional consequence contribution to the safety goal 





1. Average Individual Health Effect Risk: For this option, the average individual 
risk of each specified health effect (i.e. early fatality and latent cancer fatality) is 
calculated by summing the risk values for all compass sectors in the modeled 
spatial grid at a given distance and dividing it by the number of compass sectors. 
This averaging approach effectively assumes there is a uniform population 
distribution around the NPP site at the specified radial distance from the site. 
While this may not be a realistic assumption, this computational approach is 
needed to estimate the average individual early fatality risk within one mile of the 
NPP site boundary for comparison with the corresponding QHO when no 
individuals reside within one mile of the NPP site boundary. This MACCS output 
was therefore selected with a radial distance of one-mile for calculating the 
conditional consequence contribution to the safety goal QHO risk metric for 
comparison to the early fatality risk QHO for two reasons: (1) no individuals 
reside within one mile of the Surry site boundary; and (2) although some 
individuals reside within one mile of the Peach Bottom site boundary, this output 
metric was also used for Peach Bottom to enable a more meaningful comparison 
of results and insights with respect to this QHO across reactor and containment 
designs.s 
2. Population-Weighted Health Effect Risk. For this option, the population-
weighted health effect risk is estimated by calculating the total number of cases 
of each specified health effect in a defined spatial interval around the NPP site, 
                                                
s Since average individual early fatality risk at one-mile from the NPP site boundary was 
selected as the MACCS output to calculate the conditional consequence contribution to the 
safety goal QHO risk metric for comparison to the early fatality risk QHO, the consequence 
models developed for the single-unit accident scenarios modeled as part of the SOARCA 
pilot study had to be modified and run again to produce this specific output. MACCS Version 




and then dividing by the total population in the spatial interval. This output metric 
is typically used instead of the average individual health effect risk metric 
because its computational approach accounts for the population distribution 
around the NPP site, and can therefore produce a more realistic estimate. This 
output metric was therefore selected with a defined spatial interval of 0-10 miles 
for calculating the conditional consequence contribution to the safety goal QHO 
risk metric for comparison to the latent cancer fatality risk QHO. 
Step 8: Estimate unadjusted two-unit accident scenario risk. The unadjusted 
contribution to risk from each two-unit accident scenario ij is estimated using 
Equation (6): 
𝑅!"! ! = 𝐹!"
! ∙ 𝐶!"! |𝑖𝑗   (6) 
• 𝑅!"! ! = unadjusted mean risk contribution to each safety goal QHO risk metric 
from two-unit accident scenario ij. Unadjusted means the risk contribution has not 
been adjusted to account for the contribution to frequency from other two-unit 
accident scenarios in a similar class that scenario ij is assumed to represent. 
Step 9a: Estimate two-unit frequency adjustment factor. Similar to single-unit 
accident scenarios, an adjustment factor is needed to adjust the two-unit accident 
scenario risk estimate to account for the contribution to the frequency element of the 
risk triplet from other two-unit accident scenarios that have not been modeled and 
analyzed. This approach assumes: (1) conditional consequences from the set of all 
modeled two-unit accident scenarios collectively represent the spectrum of 
consequence contributions to the safety goal QHO risk metrics from all potential two-




conditional consequence contributions that are similar to those that would result from 
each of the other two-unit accident scenarios in the class that two-unit accident 
scenario ij is assumed to represent. Moreover, it is assumed that a global adjustment 
factor can be applied to all two-unit accident scenarios; this implies that the 
proportion of two-unit accident scenarios that are not modeled is the same for all 
classes of two-unit accident scenarios that are represented. The two-unit frequency 






  (7) 
• 𝛼! = global two-unit frequency adjustment factor. 
• 𝛽 ∙ 𝐹!"!#$!  = mean total two-unit CDF from all two-unit accident scenarios initiated 
by internal events, fires, and seismic events. This is estimated by the product of 
the unconditional mean total single-unit CDF estimate obtained from the 
NUREG-1150 study (𝐹!"!#$! ) and the global conditional probability of an accident 
in the co-located unit accident, given a specified reference unit accident 
frequency (𝛽). 
 
                                                
t Two key assumptions in this research are: (1) the two operating reactor units co-located at 
each NPP site are identical; and (2) one unit always serves as the reference unit with respect 
to the timing of accident initiation, progression, and radiological release for two-unit accident 
scenarios. Under these assumptions, only the 25 two-unit accident scenario consequence 
models needed to be run for the base case and sensitivity analyses to estimate conditional 
consequence contributions to safety goal QHO metrics for each two-unit accident scenario. 
However, since either unit on the site could serve as the reference unit, the frequency for 
each two-unit accident scenario should—in principle—be doubled to account for the 
contribution from accidents in which the other unit serves as the reference unit. Since a factor 
of two would be applied to both the numerator and denominator of Equation (7) to account for 
this frequency contribution, the value of the two-unit frequency adjustment factor would not 
be affected. Therefore, while these factors of two should conceptually be included in Equation 





• 𝐹!"!!" = combined frequency of all modeled two-unit accident scenarios that are 
assumed to be representative of the full spectrum of potential two-unit accident 
scenarios. 
Step 9b: Estimate adjusted two-unit accident scenario risk. The adjusted 
contribution to risk from each two-unit accident scenario ij is estimated using 
Equation (8): 
𝑅!"! = 𝛼! ∙ 𝑅!"! !  (8) 
 
• 𝑅!"!  = adjusted mean risk contribution to each safety goal QHO risk metric from 
the class of two-unit accidents that scenario ij is assumed to represent. Adjusted 
means the risk contribution has been adjusted to account for the contribution to 
frequency from other two-unit accident scenarios in the same class that are not 
modeled. 
 
Step 10: Estimate total two-unit accident risk. The total contribution to risk from 
all two-unit accident scenarios is estimated using Equation (9): 
𝑅!"!#$! = 𝑅!"!!"   (9) 
• 𝑅!"!#$!  = total mean risk contribution to each safety goal QHO risk metric from all 





III.B. Methods for Estimating Figures of Merit to Evaluate Policy 
Alternatives (Figure 8) 
Step 11a: Estimate risk metrics for comparison to each QHO for each safety 
goal policy alternative. The safety goal QHO risk metricsu that are to be compared 
with the corresponding QHOs are calculated for each policy alternative evaluated in 
this research using Equations (10) and (11): 
Option 1 (Status Quo): Only Single-Unit Accident Scenarios Included (𝑹𝟏)  
𝑅! = 𝑅!"!#$!   (10) 
Option 2: Single-Unit and Two-Unit Accident Scenarios Included (𝑹𝟐) 
𝑅! = 𝑅!"!#$! + 𝑅!"!#$!   (11) 
Step 11b: Estimate QHOs using data for selected year. The QHOs that are to be 
used as the basis for comparison with results for safety goal QHO risk metrics are 
calculated using Equations (12) and (13): 






v  (12) 
 
                                                
u Hereafter, the term “safety goal QHO risk metrics” is used to collectively refer to the total 
mean risk results obtained by combining mean frequency estimates with mean values for the 
two selected conditional consequence metrics calculated by MACCS: (1) average individual 
early fatality risk at one mile from the NPP site boundary; and (2) population-weighted latent 
cancer fatality risk within ten miles of the NPP site boundary. 
v Based on 2013 data from the National Vital Statistics System42 and the U.S. Census 
Bureau,43 the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from unintentional accidents for the U.S. 











w  (13) 
Step 12: Estimate QHO margin for each QHO and each safety goal policy 
alternative. The margin to each QHO is calculated for each policy alternative using 
Equations (14) and (15): 




  (14) 




  (15) 
Step 13: Estimate figures of merit for comparison of safety goal policy 
alternatives for each QHO. The figures of merit to be used for comparison of policy 
alternatives and evaluation of the effect of including the contribution from two-unit 
accident scenarios to safety goal QHO risk metrics are calculated for each policy 
alternative using Equations (16) and (17): 




∙ 100%  (16) 
 
                                                
w Based on 2013 data from the National Vital Statistics System42 and the U.S. Census 
Bureau, 43 the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all causes among the U.S. 
population is 1.85E-03 per year—which results in a latent cancer fatality risk QHO of 1.85E-








∙ 100%  (17) 
III.C. Generalizability of Approach and Methods 
Although the approach and computational methods have been developed to enable 
estimation of the contribution to safety goal QHO risk metrics from single-unit and 
two-unit accident scenarios for representative two-unit NPP sites, this approach is 
generalizable and could be expanded in application to include: 
• Additional risk metrics that characterize other types of public risks from accidents 
involving NPP sites (e.g., societal risks of radiological health effects, protective 
action impacts on the affected population, environmental impacts from land 
contamination, and economic costs); and 
• Estimation of the contribution to risk metrics of interest from multi-unit accident 
scenarios that involve combinations of more than two-units at a shared site. 
Expansion of the approach for application to NPP sites comprised of more than two 
units would require consideration of additional factors. Example factors include: 
• The conditional probabilities of accidents involving at least n units, given 
that an accident involving at least n-1 units has occurred. As shown in the 
two-unit case, these conditional probabilities that reflect the level of dependence 
between co-located units influence two estimated quantities: (1) the multi-unit 
accident scenario frequency used to calculate the unadjusted multi-unit accident 
scenario risk; and (2) the multi-unit frequency adjustment factor used to adjust 




contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios that are not modeled, but that are 
assumed to be represented by the class of multi-unit accident scenarios that 
have been modeled. The Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) method for treatment of 
CCF events32 could be adapted using operational experience data in the LER 
database to develop estimates for applicable conditional probabilities. 
• Potential inter-unit differences in design or differences in timing of 
accident initiation, progression, or radiological releases. If important 
differences between units exist, the choice of which unit serves as the reference 
unit can impact results. In addition, results from the two-unit case will 
demonstrate that differences in the timing of accident initiation, progression, and 
radiological releases between co-located units can have different effects 
depending on which unit is selected as the reference unit. Under these 
circumstances, the order in which a multi-unit accident occurs can be important. 
Therefore, the number of ways in which a multi-unit accident involving n units can 
occur would be more appropriately defined by the number of permutations 
(ordered combinations) rather than combinations. 
The expansion and application of these methods to multi-unit sites comprised of 
more than two units requires consideration and treatment of additional factors that 
necessarily complicate the analysis. Application of these methods to NPP sites 
comprised of different types of units with fundamentally different radionuclide 
inventories and risk profiles would require consideration and treatment of even more 
factors that would complicate the analysis. However, it is envisioned that existing 
methods can be adapted to address these additional complexities, and do not 





Chapter IV: Two-Unit Case Study Results and Discussion 
IV.A. Summary Results for Both Representative NPP Sites 
Summary results that address all research aims—including the base case analysis 
for Aim 1 and the one-way sensitivity analyses for Aim 2 and Aim 3—are presented 
in this section for both representative NPP sites. Section IV.B. presents additional 
results generated from the base case analysis at more detailed and site-specific 
levels for each representative NPP site. 
IV.A.1. Base Case Analysis: Effect of Including Contribution from Two-Unit 
Accident Scenarios on Safety Goal QHO Risk Metrics and QHO Margins 
Table V summarizes the results for each figure of merit by reactor-containment 
design and safety goal QHO risk metric for the base case analysis. These results 
show that including the contribution from two-unit accident scenarios results in: 
1. Non-negligible increases in risk. Including the contribution from two-unit 
accidents resulted in 15% to 77% increases in the mean values of the safety goal 
QHO risk metrics for the representative BWR,  and 18% to 20% increases in the 
mean values of the safety goal QHO risk metrics for the representative PWR. 
2. Non-negligible reductions in QHO margin. Including the contribution from two-
unit accidents resulted in 13% to 43% reductions in mean margin to QHOs for 
the representative BWR, and 16% to 17% reductions in mean margin to QHOs 
for the representative PWR. 
Table V also shows that figures of merit based on the average individual early fatality 
risk metric appear to be more sensitive to the effect of including the contribution from 




cancer fatality risk metric. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect with respect to early 
fatality risk appears to be greater for the representative BWR site (Peach Bottom) 
than for the representative PWR site (Surry). 
Table V. Summary Results for Each Figure of Merit by Safety Goal QHO Risk Metric 





Figure 10. Relative Contributions of Single-Unit Accidents and Two-Unit Accidents to 
Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi). Two-unit accidents contribute 
more to total early fatality risk relative to single-unit accidents for the representative BWR site 
than for the representative PWR site. 
 
Figure of Merit 1 Figure of Merit 2
(% change risk)a (% change QHO margin)a
Average Individual Early Fatality Risk 
(1 mi) 77% -43%
Population-Weighted Latent Cancer 
Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) 15% -13%
Average Individual Early Fatality Risk 
(1 mi) 20% -17%
Population-Weighted Latent Cancer 
Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) 18% -16%
Safety Goal QHO Risk Metric
Representative BWR (Peach Bottom) Analysis
Representative PWR (Surry) Analysis
a Each figure of merit represents a percent change that compares results with both single-unit 
and multi-unit accident scenario contributions included, relative to only single-unit accident 
contributions included.
Representative BWR (Peach Bottom) Representative PWR (Surry) 
Relative Contributions of Single-Unit Accidents and Two-Unit Accidents 













Figure 11. Relative Contributions of Single-Unit Accidents and Two-Unit Accidents to 
Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi). The relative 
contributions of single-unit accidents and two-unit accidents to total latent cancer fatality risk 
are approximately the same for the representative BWR site and the representative PWR 
site.  
Figure 10 displays the relative contributions of single-unit accidents and two-unit 
accidents to total early fatality risk for both the representative BWR site and the 
representative PWR site. Figure 11 displays similar results with respect to total latent 
cancer fatality risk. Taken together, these figures suggest that early fatality risk is 
more sensitive to the effect of including the contribution from two-unit accidents than 
latent cancer fatality risk because two-unit accidents contribute a greater percentage 
to total early fatality risk relative to single-unit accidents for each NPP site than they 
contribute to total latent cancer fatality risk. Moreover, it appears that the magnitude 
of the effect of including the contribution from two-unit accident scenarios to early 
fatality risk is greater for the representative BWR site than for the representative 
PWR site because two-unit accidents comprise a greater percentage of total early 
fatality risk for the BWR site (43% for the BWR versus 17% for the PWR). By 
contrast, the two representative sites have comparable risk profiles with respect to 
latent cancer fatality risk, thereby resulting in similar effect estimates using figures of 
merit based on the population-weighted latent cancer fatality risk metric. 
Representative BWR (Peach Bottom) Representative PWR (Surry) 
Relative Contributions of Single-Unit Accidents and Two-Unit Accidents 












IV.A.2. One-Way Sensitivity Analyses: Effect of Variation in Assumed Level of 
Inter-Unit Dependence 
Table VI summarizes results obtained for each figure of merit by reactor-containment 
design and safety goal QHO risk metric by performing one-way sensitivity analyses 
in which the assumed value of β—the global conditional probability of an accident 
occurring in the co-located unit, given that an accident occurs in the reference unit at 
a specified frequency—was varied over its full range of possible values from 0 to 1. 
Concurrent accidents involving the co-located and reference units were assumed to 
occur simultaneously as in the base case. 
Table VI. Summary Results for Effect of Variation in Assumed Level of Inter-Unit 
Dependence  
 
These results appear to reinforce the findings from the base case analysis. 
Increasing the value of β effectively increases the frequency element of the risk 
contribution from two-unit accident scenarios, thereby increasing the relative 
importance of two-unit accidents compared to single-unit accidents. We would 
therefore expect the effect of including the contribution from two-unit accident 
scenarios to increase as β increases, and this is what we observe. 
β = 0.1b β = 1 β = 0.1b β = 1
Average Individual Early Fatality Risk 
(1 mi) 77% 770% -43% -89%
Population-Weighted Latent Cancer 
Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) 15% 150% -13% -60%
Average Individual Early Fatality Risk 
(1 mi) 20% 200% -17% -67%
Population-Weighted Latent Cancer 
Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) 18% 180% -16% -65%
Representative PWR (Surry) Analysis
a Each figure of merit represents a percent change that compares results with both single-unit and multi-
unit accident scenario contributions included, relative to only single-unit accident contributions included.
b For β = 0, which is equivalent to assuming there are no inter-unit dependencies that could give rise to 
two-unit accidents given that single-unit accidents occur in the reference unit at a specified frequency, 
including the contribution from two-unit accidents to safety goal QHO risk metrics has no effect. These 
trivial results are not displayed here to conserve space.
Safety Goal QHO Risk Metric
Figure of Merit 1
(% change risk)a
Figure of Merit 2
(% change QHO margin)a




Coupled with the results displayed in Figures 12 and 13—which respectively 
illustrate the effect of variation in β on the figures of merit for early fatality risk and 
latent cancer fatality risk for both representative NPP sites—we also observe that the 
figure of merit for percent change in risk appears to be more sensitive to the effect of 
variation in β than the figure of merit for percent change in QHO margin. Whereas 
the percent increase in risk increases linearly as β increases, the percent reduction 
in QHO margin increases less than linearly as β increases. As shown in Section 
IV.B., several orders of magnitude in margin to both QHOs exist for the base case 
analysis. Therefore, while increasing β to its maximum possible value of 1 causes an 
order of magnitude increase in the percent change in risk, the absolute change in 
risk is still small relative to the QHO margin. Thus a smaller effect is observed with 
respect to the percent change in QHO margin. 
 
Figure 12. Effect of Variation in Assumed Level of Inter-Unit Dependence on Total 
Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi). Variation in the value of 𝜷 has a 
greater effect on the figure of merit for percent change in early fatality risk (displayed in 
orange) than the figure of merit for percent change in margin to the early fatality risk QHO 
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Figure 13. Effect of Variation in Assumed Level of Inter-Unit Dependence on Total 
Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi). Variation in the value of 
𝜷 also has a greater effect on the figure of merit for percent change in latent cancer fatality 
risk (displayed in orange) than the figure of merit for percent change in margin to the latent 
cancer fatality risk QHO (displayed in yellow) for both representative NPP sites. 
IV.A.3. One-Way Sensitivity Analyses: Effect of Variation in Assumed Timing 
Offset Between Concurrent Two-Unit Accident Scenarios 
Figures 14 through 17 illustrate the scenario-specific risk results from one-way 
sensitivity analyses that were performed to evaluate the effect of variation in the 
assumed timing offset between concurrent two-unit accident scenarios. As in the 
base case, the value of β was assumed to be 0.10. Scenario-specific risk results are 
presented in lieu of results for the figures of merit because variation in the assumed 
timing offset resulted in a negligible effect on the figures of merit, while scenario-
specific risk results highlight interesting findings from the one-way sensitivity 
analyses. 
Figures 14 and 15 show that two-unit accident scenarios that include a more rapidly 
progressing STSBO scenario (STSBO-Base for the representative BWR analysis 
and STSBO-TISGTR for the representative PWR analysis) as a constituent accident 
Effect of Variation in Assumed Inter-Unit Dependence 
Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) 
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scenario in the co-located unit exhibit a rapid decline in the average individual early 
fatality risk metric as the timing offset between concurrent accidents is varied from 0 
(the assumed simultaneous accidents in both units for the base case) to a one-day 
offset between the co-located unit and reference unit accident scenarios. However, 
the same pattern is not observed for the mirror-image two-unit accident scenarios 
that have these more rapidly progressing STSBO scenarios as a constituent accident 
scenario in the reference unit. Whereas the mirror-image scenarios have identical 
results for the simultaneous case—which is expected based on the key assumption 
of identical units—their results diverge as the timing offset is increased from 0 days. 
In all of these cases, the average individual early fatality risk is significantly reduced 
as the timing offset is increased to effectively model alternative delay times for the 
more rapidly progressing scenario in the co-located unit, relative to the reference-unit 
accident scenario. 
While not displayed, evaluation of the underlying data revealed that all of the early 
fatalities attributed to modeled two-unit accident scenarios occur among the 0.5% of 
the offsite population within ten miles of each NPP site that is assumed to not 
evacuate in response to each accident and instead maintains normal activity. As the 
timing offset is increased to model greater delay times for the more rapidly 
progressing scenario in the co-located, the number of early fatalities predicted to 
occur among this non-evacuating population decreases. A number of factors could 
be contributing to the observed behavior, including potential interactions between the 
delay time, accident progression timing, and: (1) statistical variability in weather 
conditions; and/or (2) implementation of protective actions (e.g., dose-dependent 






Figure 14. Effect of Variation in the Assumed Timing Offset Between Concurrent 
Accidents on Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) for a 
Representative BWR Site. Increasing the delay time for more rapidly progressing accident 
scenarios in the co-located unit results in significant reductions in early fatality risk among the 
offsite population that is assumed to not evacuate for a representative BWR site. 
 
 
Figure 15. Effect of Variation in the Assumed Timing Offset Between Concurrent 
Accidents on Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) for a 
Representative PWR Site. Increasing the delay time for more rapidly progressing accident 
scenarios in the co-located unit also results in significant reductions in early fatality risk 
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Figures 16 and 17 show that a different pattern is observed with respect to the total 
mean population-weighted latent cancer fatality risk metric. As shown in Figure 17, 
variation in the assumed timing offset between concurrent accidents in both units 
does not significantly impact latent cancer fatality risk for the representative PWR 
site. In general, this finding also applies to the representative BWR site. However, 
Figure 16 shows that the latent cancer fatality risk attributable to the class of two-unit 
accident scenarios represented by BWR1—which is comprised of LTSBO scenarios 
in both the co-located and reference units—actually increased as the timing offset 
was varied from 0 to 7 days. 
While not displayed, evaluation of the underlying data revealed that all of the 
increase in the population-weighted latent cancer fatality risk for this scenario is 
attributed to increases in the risk attributed to long-term exposures that occur during 
the recovery phase of response to the two-unit accident. One possible explanation 
for this observation is that increasing the timing offset between constituent accident 
scenarios effectively provides more time for the weather conditions—especially wind 
direction—to change between releases of sequential plume segments. As a result, 
larger areas of land would be contaminated at lower levels of radioactivity. For this 
reason, larger areas of contaminated land would be able to be returned to habitability 
for a specified habitability criterion.x Thus, more individuals would be allowed to 
return home to land that has been contaminated, and would therefore be exposed to 
residual levels of contamination for the duration of the long-term phase. Since a 
dose-response model based on the linear no-threshold (LNT) hypothesis is used to 
calculate excess latent cancer fatalities attributable to the modeled accident 
scenarios, this increase in the number of individuals exposed to low levels of 
                                                
x The habitability criterion represents a maximum dose and an exposure period to receive 




radiation would necessarily result in a proportional increase in the population-
weighted latent cancer fatality risk.y While this explanation seems reasonable, it 
cannot be used to explain why other two-unit accident scenarios that include the 
LTSBO scenario as a constituent do not exhibit similar behavior. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that there may be synergistic effects or 
interactions between the assumed timing offset between concurrent accident 
scenarios, the timing of accident progression for the constituent accident scenarios, 
and other factors. However, additional research would be needed to formulate and 
test alternative hypotheses to obtain further insights into the underlying causes for 
this observed behavior.   
                                                
y In the SOARCA pilot study, sensitivity analyses were performed to evaluate the impact of 
using plausible alternative dose-response models. Whereas the base case analyses used an 
LNT-based dose-response model, sensitivity cases used alternative dose truncation models 
for which the excess lifetime cancer cases attributable to modeled accidents were not 
quantified below specified dose levels. For this thesis research, only the LNT-based dose-
response model from the base case analyses was used; no additional sensitivity analyses 





Figure 16. Effect of Variation in the Assumed Timing Offset Between Concurrent 
Accidents on Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) for 
a Representative BWR Site. In general, variation in the timing offset between concurrent 
accident scenarios does not significantly impact latent cancer fatality risk for a representative 
BWR site. Where an increasing trend is observed, the increase is entirely attributed to latent 
cancers arising from long-term exposures during the recovery phase. 
 
 
Figure 17. Effect of Variation in the Assumed Timing Offset Between Concurrent 
Accidents on Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) for 
a Representative PWR Site. Variation in the timing offset between concurrent accident 
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IV.B. More Detailed Site-Specific Results for the Base Case Analysis 
Whereas Section IV.A. presents summary results that address all research aims for 
both representative NPP sites, this section presents additional results generated 
from the base case analysis at more detailed and site-specific levels for each 
representative NPP site and each safety goal QHO. 
IV.B.1. Representative BWR (Peach Bottom) Base Case Analysis 
Early Fatality Risk QHO 
Figures 18 and 19 respectively illustrate: (1) the distribution of adjusted single-unit 
risk contributions to the average individual early fatality risk metric for all single-unit 
accident scenarios modeled for Peach Bottom as part of the SOARCA pilot study; 
and (2) the distribution of adjusted two-unit risk contributions to the average 
individual early fatality risk metric for all two-unit accident scenarios modeled for this 
research. Figure 18 shows that the only class of single-unit accident scenarios to 
contribute to average individual early fatality risk at one-mile from the NPP site 
boundary is the class represented by the unmitigated and rapidly progressing 
STSBO-Base scenario. This finding is reasonable, considering the shorter period of 
time within this class of accident scenarios for Offsite Response Organizations 
(OROs) to implement protective actions that aim to reduce radiological dose and 
avoid deterministic health effects such as early injuries and fatalities arising from 





Figure 18. Distribution of Adjusted Single-Unit Accident Scenario Risk Contributions to 
Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) for a Representative BWR Site. 
Single-unit accident scenarios represented by the unmitigated and rapidly progressing 
STSBO scenario are the only class of single-unit accident scenarios to contribute to early 
fatality risk for the representative BWR site. 
 
Figure 19. Distribution of Adjusted Two-Unit Accident Scenario Risk Contributions to 
Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) for a Representative BWR Site. 
Two-unit accident scenarios represented by scenarios that include the unmitigated and 
rapidly progressing STSBO scenario as a constituent are the dominant contributors to early 








1.42E-14, 3% 1.42E-14, 3% 
BWR1 - Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: LTSBO 
BWR2 - Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: STSBO-Base 
BWR3 - Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: STSBO-RCIC 
BWR4 - Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: LTSBO 
BWR5 - Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: STSBO-Base 
BWR6 - Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: STSBO-RCIC 
BWR7 - Unit 1: STSBO-RCIC, Unit 2: LTSBO 
BWR8 - Unit 1: STSBO-RCIC, Unit 2: STSBO-Base 




Figure 19 shows that the classes of two-unit accident scenarios that dominate the 
contributions to average individual early fatality risk at one-mile from the NPP site 
boundary are those classes that include the STSBO-Base scenario as a constituent 
accident scenario in either or both the reference unit and the co-located unit. 
Moreover, the class of two-unit accident scenarios represented by BWR 5—which is 
comprised of simultaneous STSBO-Base scenarios in both units—is the dominant 
contributor to two-unit accident risk with respect to average individual early fatality 
risk, comprising 42% of the total two-unit risk. This finding shows that accident 
progression and radiological release timing with respect to implementation of 
protective actions to avoid radiological dose is also important in the context of multi-
unit accident scenarios. 
Table VII summarizes the base case analysis results for the figures of merit that are 
used to evaluate the effect of expanding the scope of the safety goal policy to 
include the contribution to risk from multi-unit accident scenarios. As shown, 
combining the single-unit and two-unit contributions to average individual early 
fatality risk results in: (1) a 77% increase in risk; and (2) a 43% reduction in margin to 
the QHO. 
Table VII. Base Case Analysis Results with Respect to the Early Fatality Risk QHO for a 
Representative BWR Site. 
  
Policy Alternative / Figure of Merit Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) QHO Margin
Option 1 (Status Quo): Only Single-
Unit Accident Scenarios Included 6.E-13 6.E+05
Option 2: Single-Unit and Two-Unit 
Accident Scenarios Included 1.E-12 4.E+05
Figures of Merit: Percent Change 




Latent Cancer Fatality Risk QHO 
Figures 20 and 21 respectively illustrate: (1) the distribution of adjusted single-unit 
risk contributions to the population-weighted latent cancer fatality risk metric for all 
single-unit accident scenarios modeled for Peach Bottom as part of the SOARCA 
pilot study; and (2) the distribution of adjusted two-unit risk contributions to the 
population-weighted latent cancer fatality risk metric for all two-unit accident 
scenarios modeled for this research. Figure 20 shows that the dominant class of 
single-unit accident scenarios that contribute to population-weighted latent cancer 
fatality risk within 10 miles of the NPP site boundary is the class represented by the 
LTSBO scenario, which comprises 77% of the total single-unit accident risk for this 
metric. This finding is reasonable, considering two effects the longer release 
durations can have on offsite response to this class of scenarios: 
1. The longer period of time for OROs to implement protective actions that reduce 
early phase radiological exposures—which increases the probability that 
individuals who receive early phase doses will die from cancer over the course of 
their lifetime, while making it less likely that they will die from acute exposures to 
high levels of radiation over short periods of time. 
2. The longer release durations also provide more time for the weather conditions—
especially wind direction—to change between releases of sequential plume 
segments. As a result, larger areas of land would be contaminated at lower levels 
of radioactivity. For this reason, larger areas of contaminated land would be able 
to be returned to habitability for a specified habitability criterion. Thus, more 
individuals would be allowed to return home to land that has been contaminated, 




duration of the long-term phase. Since a dose-response model based on the LNT 
hypothesis is used to calculate excess latent cancer fatalities attributable to the 
modeled accident scenarios, this increase in the number of individuals exposed 
to low levels of radiation will result in a proportional increase in the population-
weighted latent cancer fatality risk. 
 
 
Figure 20. Distribution of Adjusted Single-Unit Accident Scenario Risk Contributions to 
Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) for a 
Representative BWR Site. Single-unit accident scenarios represented by the more slowly 
progressing LTSBO scenario are the dominant contributors to latent cancer fatality risk from 











Figure 21. Distribution of Adjusted Two-Unit Accident Scenario Risk Contributions to 
Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) for a 
Representative BWR Site. Two-unit accident scenarios represented by scenarios that 
include a more slowly progressing LTSBO scenario as a constituent are the dominant 
contributors to latent cancer fatality risk from two-unit accidents for a representative BWR 
site. 
Figure 21 shows that the classes of two-unit accident scenarios that dominate the 
contributions to population weighted latent cancer fatality risk within 10 miles from 
the NPP site boundary are those classes that include the LTSBO scenario as a 
constituent accident scenario in either or both the reference unit and the co-located 
unit. Moreover, the class of two-unit accident scenarios represented by BWR 1—
which is comprised of simultaneous LTSBO scenarios in both units—is the dominant 
contributor to two-unit accident risk with respect to population-weighted latent cancer 
fatality risk, comprising 62% of the total two-unit risk. This finding shows that 
accident progression and radiological release timing with respect to increasing 
dispersion of radionuclides and the size of the population exposed to low-levels of 
radioactive contamination for long periods of time upon returning home are also 
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Table VIII summarizes the base case analysis results for the figures of merit that are 
used to evaluate the effect of expanding the scope of the safety goal policy to 
include the contribution to risk from multi-unit accident scenarios. As shown, 
combining the single-unit and two-unit contributions to population-weighted latent 
cancer fatality risk results in: (1) a 15% increase in risk; and (2) a 13% reduction in 
margin to the QHO. 
Table VIII. Base Case Analysis Results with Respect to the Latent Cancer Fatality Risk 
QHO for a Representative BWR Site. 
 
Contrasting the base case analysis results with respect to both the early fatality risk 
QHO and the latent cancer fatality risk QHO, early fatality risk appears to be more 
sensitive to the effect of including the contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios 
than latent cancer fatality risk. This finding is reasonable and illustrates a principal 
concern with respect to multi-unit accident scenarios: that including the contribution 
from such accidents can be more important with respect to offsite radiological 
consequences such as early fatalities that are subject to non-linear behavior arising 
from threshold effects.  
  
Policy Alternative / Figure of Merit Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) QHO Margin
Option 1 (Status Quo): Only Single-
Unit Accident Scenarios Included 3.E-09 7.E+02
Option 2: Single-Unit and Two-Unit 
Accident Scenarios Included 3.E-09 6.E+02
Figures of Merit: Percent Change 




IV.B.1. Representative PWR (Surry) Base Case Analysis 
Early Fatality Risk QHO 
Figures 22 and 23 respectively illustrate: (1) the distribution of adjusted single-unit 
risk contributions to the average individual early fatality risk metric for all single-unit 
accident scenarios modeled for Surry as part of the SOARCA pilot study; and (2) the 
distribution of adjusted two-unit risk contributions to the average individual early 
fatality risk metric for all two-unit accident scenarios modeled for this research. 
Figure 22 shows that the only class of single-unit accident scenarios to contribute to 
average individual early fatality risk at one-mile from the NPP site boundary is the 
class represented by the ISLOCA scenario. This finding is reasonable, considering 
the failure event that causes bypass of the containment structure, resulting in larger 
amounts of radiological materials being released over shorter periods of time, before 
OROs can effectively implement protective actions. 
 
Figure 22. Distribution of Adjusted Single-Unit Accident Scenario Risk Contributions to 
Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) for a Representative PWR Site. 
Single-unit accident scenarios represented by the ISLOCA scenario are the only class of 










Figure 23. Distribution of Adjusted Two-Unit Accident Scenario Risk Contributions to 
Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) for a Representative PWR Site. 
Two-unit accident scenarios represented by scenarios that include a containment bypass 
scenario as a constituent are the dominant contributors to early fatality risk from two-unit 
accidents for a representative PWR site. 
Figure 23 shows that the classes of two-unit accident scenarios that dominate the 
contributions to average individual early fatality risk at one-mile from the NPP site 
boundary are those classes that include a scenario involving containment bypass as 
a constituent accident scenario in either or both the reference unit and the co-located 
unit. These classes of scenarios comprise more than 98% of the total two-unit 
accident risk with respect to early fatality risk. This finding shows that containment 
failure or bypass events are also important in the context of multi-unit accident 
scenarios. 
Table IX summarizes the base case analysis results for the figures of merit that are 
used to evaluate the effect of expanding the scope of the safety goal policy to 
include the contribution to risk from multi-unit accident scenarios. As shown, 
combining the single-unit and two-unit contributions to average individual early 
1.57E-12, 45% 
1.57E-13, 4% 







PWR1 - Unit 1 LTSBO, Unit 2: LTSBO 
PWR2 - Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: STSBO-Base 
PWR3 - Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: STSBO-TISGTR 
PWR4 - Unit 1: LTSBO, Unit 2: ISLOCA 
PWR5 - Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: LTSBO 
PWR6 - Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: STSBO-Base 
PWR7 - Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: STSBO-TISGTR 
PWR8 - Unit 1: STSBO-Base, Unit 2: ISLOCA 
PWR9 - Unit 1: STSBO-TISGTR, Unit 2: LTSBO 
PWR10 - Unit 1: STSBO-TISGTR, Unit 2: STSBO-Base 
PWR11 - Unit 1: STSBO-TISGTR, Unit 2: STSBO-TISGTR 
PWR12 - Unit 1: STSBO-TISGTR, Unit 2: ISLOCA 
PWR13 - Unit 1: ISLOCA, Unit 2: LTSBO 
PWR14 - Unit 1: ISLOCA, Unit 2: STSBO-Base 
PWR15 - Unit 1: ISLOCA, Unit 2: STSBO-TISGTR 




fatality risk results in: (1) a 20% increase in risk; and (2) a 17% reduction in margin to 
the QHO. Contrasting these results with the corresponding results for the BWR 
analysis presented in Table VII, it is apparent that the average individual early fatality 
risk metric is more sensitive to the effects of including the contribution from multi-unit 
accident scenarios for the representative BWR site than for the representative PWR 
site. This difference is likely due to differences in the relative contributions of two-unit 
versus single-unit accidents to early fatality risk for the two NPP sites. As shown in 
Figure 10, two-unit accidents comprise a greater percentage of total early fatality risk 
for the representative BWR site (43%) than for the representative PWR site (17%). 
Table IX. Base Case Analysis Results with Respect to the Early Fatality Risk QHO for a 
Representative PWR Site. 
 
  
Policy Alternative / Figure of Merit Total Mean Average Individual Early Fatality Risk (1 mi) QHO Margin
Option 1 (Status Quo): Only Single-
Unit Accident Scenarios Included 2.E-11 2.E+04
Option 2: Single-Unit and Two-Unit 
Accident Scenarios Included 2.E-11 2.E+04
Figures of Merit: Percent Change 




Latent Cancer Fatality Risk QHO 
Figures 24 and 25 respectively illustrate: (1) the distribution of adjusted single-unit 
risk contributions to the population-weighted latent cancer fatality risk metric for all 
single-unit accident scenarios modeled for Surry as part of the SOARCA pilot study; 
and (2) the distribution of adjusted two-unit risk contributions to the population-
weighted latent cancer fatality risk metric for all two-unit accident scenarios modeled 
for this research. Figure 24 shows that the dominant class of single-unit accident 
scenarios that contribute to population-weighted latent cancer fatality risk within 10 
miles of the NPP site boundary is the class represented by the LTSBO scenario, 
which comprises 74% of the total single-unit accident risk for this metric. This finding 
is consistent with what was observed in the representative BWR analysis and relies 
on a similar interpretation of the results. 
 
Figure 24. Distribution of Adjusted Single-Unit Accident Scenario Risk Contributions to 
Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) for a 
Representative PWR Site. Single-unit accident scenarios represented by the more slowly 
progressing LTSBO scenario are the dominant contributors to latent cancer fatality risk from 













Figure 25. Distribution of Adjusted Two-Unit Accident Scenario Risk Contributions to 
Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) for a 
Representative PWR Site. Two-unit accident scenarios represented by scenarios that 
include a more slowly progressing LTSBO scenario as a constituent are the dominant 
contributors to latent cancer fatality risk from two-unit accidents for a representative PWR 
site. 
Figure 25 shows that the classes of two-unit accident scenarios that dominate the 
contributions to population-weighted latent cancer fatality risk within 10 miles from 
the NPP site boundary are those classes that include the LTSBO scenario as a 
constituent accident scenario in either or both the reference unit and the co-located 
unit. Moreover, the class of two-unit accident scenarios represented by PWR 1—
which is comprised of simultaneous LTSBO scenarios in both units—is the dominant 
contributor to two-unit accident risk with respect to population-weighted latent cancer 
fatality risk, comprising 66% of the total two-unit risk. This finding is consistent with 
what was observed in the representative BWR analysis and relies on a similar 
interpretation of the results. 
Table X summarizes the base case analysis results for the figures of merit that are 
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include the contribution to risk from multi-unit accident scenarios. As shown, 
combining the single-unit and two-unit contributions to population-weighted latent 
cancer fatality risk results in: (1) a 18% increase in risk; and (2) a 16% reduction in 
margin to the QHO. Comparing these results with the corresponding results for the 
BWR analysis presented in Table VIII, the notable difference between the 
representative NPP sites with respect to the effect of including multi-unit accident 
contributions to early fatality risk are not apparent in the effect estimates with respect 
to latent cancer fatality risk. This is likely because the two NPP sites have similar 
relative contributions of two-unit versus single-unit accidents to latent cancer fatality 
risk. As shown in Figure 11, two-unit accidents comprise 13% of total latent cancer 
fatality risk for the representative BWR site and 16% for the representative PWR site. 
Table X. Base Case Analysis Results with Respect to the Latent Cancer Fatality Risk 
QHO for a Representative PWR Site. 
 
Moreover, comparing the base case analysis results with respect to both the early 
fatality risk QHO and the latent cancer fatality risk QHO shows that—in contrast to 
what was observed for the representative BWR site—including the contribution from 
multi-unit accident scenarios appears to have a similar effect on both early fatality 
risk and latent cancer fatality risk for the representative PWR site. As shown in 
Figures 10 and 11 respectively, this is likely because two-unit accidents contribute 
similar percentages to total early fatality risk (17%) and total latent cancer fatality risk 
(16%) for the representative PWR site.  
Policy Alternative Total Mean Population-Weighted Latent Cancer Fatality Risk (0-10 mi) QHO Margin
Option 1 (Status Quo): Only Single-
Unit Accident Scenarios Included 4.E-09 4.E+02
Option 2: Single-Unit and Two-Unit 
Accident Scenarios Included 5.E-09 4.E+02
Figures of Merit: Percent Change 




Chapter V:  Conclusions and Recommendations 
V.A. Research Summary 
The overall aim of this thesis research was to evaluate the effect of including the 
contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios to safety goal QHO risk metrics in 
safety goal policy applications. To do this, two policy alternatives were identified for 
evaluation: (1) a status quo option that reflects the existing application of the safety 
goal policy by including only the contribution from single-unit accident scenarios in 
estimating the safety goal QHO risk metrics; and (2) a second option that reflects a 
hypothetical expansion in the scope and application of the safety goal policy by 
including the contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios to these risk metrics. 
Two figures of merit were then developed to evaluate the effect of including the 
contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios to safety goal QHO risk metrics. 
These figures of merit accomplish this by quantifying the relative difference between 
the two policy alternatives with respect to: (1) the safety goal QHO risk metrics; and 
(2) the margin to the QHOs. 
To leverage decades of severe accident research that has led to an improved 
understanding and modeling of severe accident and offsite radiological consequence 
phenomena, the SOARCA pilot study was selected as the foundation for this 
research to build upon. This extensively peer-reviewed PCA developed state-of-the-
art models and integrated analyses of accident progression and offsite radiological 
consequences to estimate the realistic outcomes for a limited set of single-unit 
accident scenarios that were judged to be important for two NPP sites considered to 
be representative of a large group of NPP sites that use similar BWR and PWR 




Using the state-of-the-art consequence models for each of the single-unit accidents 
that were selected for detailed modeling and evaluation as part of the SOARCA pilot 
study, a set of 25 two-unit accident scenario consequence models were developed, 
with one unit serving as the reference unit with respect to the timing of accident 
initiation, progression, and radiological releases. For a base case analysis, each of 
these two-unit accident scenario models were run to estimate the conditional 
consequence contribution to safety goal QHO risk metrics assuming the reference 
unit and co-located unit accident scenarios occur simultaneously. For each modeled 
two-unit accident scenario, seven one-way sensitivity analyses were then performed 
to evaluate the effect of varying the assumed timing offset between concurrent two-
unit accidents from 1 to 7 days in one-day increments; this resulted in a total of 200 
two-unit accident simulations and sets of conditional consequence metrics for 
evaluation. 
To evaluate the effects of including the contribution to safety goal risk metrics from 
two-unit accidents relative to including only the contribution from single-unit 
accidents, methods were developed for estimating the figures of merit using the 
conditional consequence results from state-of-the-art consequence models 
developed as part of the SOARCA pilot study and this research. A key assumption 
that underlies this approach is that the set of modeled single-unit and two-unit 
accident scenarios are representative of the broad spectrum of all possible single-
unit and two-unit accident scenarios with respect to their conditional consequence 
contribution to the safety goal QHO risk metrics. This assumption allows for adjusting 
the scenario-specific risk results to develop an adjusted measure of risk that 
accounts for the contribution to the frequency element from accident scenarios in 




In this approach, a global conditional probability of an accident in the co-located unit, 
given a specified reference unit accident frequency is used to estimate: (1) the 
frequency for each two-unit accident scenario; and (2) the frequency adjustment 
factor that is used to adjust risk measures to account for the unmodeled accident 
scenarios. A key assumption that underlies the use of this parameter is that a global 
average value can be applied across all two-unit accident scenarios. For the base 
case analysis, the value of this parameter was assumed to be 0.1. One-way 
sensitivity analyses were then performed to evaluate the effect of varying this 
parameter over its entire range of possible values from 0 to 1. 
Although equations were developed and calculations were performed specifically for 
a two-unit case study involving two representative NPP sites, the overall approach 
and methods are generalizable and can be expanded to perform similar evaluations 
for NPP sites comprised of diverse and more than two co-located units. 
V.B. Key Conclusions 
Demonstration of the approach and methods to the two-unit case using two 
representative NPP sites generated a number of findings and insights that are 
documented in Chapter IV. Key conclusions developed from this research are: 
1. Including the contribution from multi-unit accidents results in non-
negligible increases in safety goal QHO risk metrics and reductions in QHO 
margin. The magnitude of the effect depends on the safety goal QHO risk metric 
under consideration and the reactor-containment design—with effect differences 
being driven by the site-specific relative contributions of single-unit accidents 
versus multi-unit accidents to the risk metric under consideration. 




multi-unit accidents is more sensitive to assumptions about the level of 
inter-unit dependence than the percent change in QHO margin. This appears 
to be due to the several orders of magnitude in margin to both QHOs that exist 
even for the worst-case assumption of complete inter-unit dependence. 
Therefore, while including the contribution from multi-unit accidents to safety goal 
QHO metrics may result in non-negligible increases in risk estimates, this 
expansion in the scope of the safety goal policy may not result in different 
conclusions from safety goal evaluations. 
3. There may be synergistic effects between the assumed timing offset 
between concurrent accident scenarios and other factors that influence 
offsite radiological consequences (e.g., statistical variability in weather 
conditions and protective actions taken to reduce radiological dose). 
Additional research is needed to formulate and test alternative hypotheses about 
the underlying causes of the observed behavior. 
V.C. Research Limitations and Recommendations 
insights derived from this research can be used to inform current USNRC and 
nuclear industry stakeholder deliberations about whether and to what extent the 
existing safety goal policy should be expanded to include consideration of the risk 
contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios. However, like any research study that 
aims to address questions pertaining to complex systems, limitations in study design 
and the need to make choices and assumptions with respect to model structure or 
parameter values can: (1) limit the extent to which findings can be generalized 
beyond the study population; and/or (2) introduce the potential for bias in results and 




The overall design for this research study was summarized in Section I.E. Key 
assumptions that underlie this study design were then highlighted in Section I.F. 
Finally, Section I.G. describes the scope of the analysis, clearly identifying aspects 
that have been deliberately excluded from this analysis. 
In this section, the limitations and assumptions that are judged to have the greatest 
potential for introducing bias or limiting the generalizability of study findings are 
highlighted, along with recommendations for future research to address known 
issues. 
V.C.1. Reactor-Containment Design and NPP Site Study Population 
Since the SOARCA pilot study was selected as the foundation for this research to 
build upon, only 6% (2 out of 35) of the population of multi-unit NPP sites in the U.S. 
was selected for detailed modeling and evaluation as part of this research study. Yet 
these two NPP sites utilize reactor and containment designs similar to those used at 
sites that collectively represent 74% (26 out of 35) of U.S. multi-unit NPP sites. 
These two NPP sites have therefore been selected for inclusion in a number of 
previous NPP Level 3 PRA studies and PCA studies. 
However, this also means that these two “representative” BWR and PWR sites may 
not adequately represent 25% (9 out of 35) of U.S. multi-unit NPP sites. Moreover, 
even for those NPP sites that share a similar reactor and containment design, there 
will always be site-specific or even unit-specific differences that can lead to 
differences in risk contributors. For these reasons, caution should be used in 
attempting to generalize the findings of this study to other NPP sites. 
Additional research is therefore needed to apply the methods developed as part of 




its continued use of best practices developed as part of the SOARCA pilot study, the 
follow-on SOARCA study for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant37 described in Section 
II.D.7 could serve as the foundation for a logical next step. 
V.C.2. Set of Modeled Accident Scenarios and Method for Estimating Risk 
Metrics 
A collective total of 32 single-unit and two-unit accident scenarios (12 for a 
representative BWR and 20 for a representative PWR) were selected for detailed 
modeling and evaluation as part of this research study. The safety goal QHOs were 
developed for comparison with risk results for corresponding metrics from full-scope 
NPP Level 3 PRAs that model a reasonably complete set of accident scenarios 
intended to represent the full spectrum of potential accident scenarios. To evaluate 
the effect of expanding the scope of the safety goal policy to include consideration of 
the risk contribution from multi-unit accident scenarios, methods were developed for 
estimating risk-based figures of merit using the conditional consequence results from 
the state-of-the-art consequence models developed as part of the SOARCA pilot 
study and this research. A key assumption underlying this approach is that the set of 
modeled single-unit and two-unit accident scenarios are representative of the broad 
spectrum of all possible single-unit and two-unit accident scenarios with respect to 
their conditional consequence contribution to the safety goal QHO risk metrics. This 
assumption allowed for adjusting the scenario-specific risk results to develop an 
adjusted measure of risk that accounts for the contribution to the frequency element 
from accident scenarios in similar classes that have not been modeled. 
Additional research is needed to: (1) benchmark this method of using a frequency 
adjustment factor to adjust for the contribution to risk from accident scenarios that 




which a limited set of modeled accident scenarios can represent the full spectrum of 
potential accident consequences. Previously completed NPP Level 3 PRA studies 
(e.g. the NUREG-1150 study)41 could provide a useful starting point, but are 
becoming increasingly dated—especially with respect to the offsite consequence 
models. Future NPP Level 3 PRA studies that leverage our improved understanding 
of severe accident progression and offsite radiological consequences would likely 
prove to be more useful. A potential candidate once it is completed and the results 
are made publicly available includes the USNRC’s ongoing project to develop a full-
scope, integrated site Level 3 PRA model for a U.S. multi-unit NPP site.44 In addition 
to serving as a more contemporary reference, this study could potentially provide 
useful information about the applicability of this approach to NPP sites comprised of 
multiple and diverse radiological sources, including spent fuel pool units and dry cask 
storage facilities. 
V.C.3. Research Questions and Selected Risk Metrics 
This research study was designed to evaluate the implications of expanding the 
safety goal policy to include consideration of the contribution from multi-unit accident 
scenarios to the safety goal QHO metrics. The figures of merit selected for 
evaluation were thus based solely on the safety goal QHO metrics. 
There are many other research questions that could be studied with respect to the 
safety goal policy and the implications of expanding its scope. Of particular interest in 
the wake of the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident are the potential implications of 
expanding the scope of the safety goal policy and QHOs to include additional risk 
metrics that can provide a more complete characterization of the public risks 
attributable to nuclear accidents than the safety goal QHO metrics alone can provide. 




radiological health effects (e.g., population dose and total numbers of radiological 
health effects); (2) protective action impacts on the affected population (e.g., total 
numbers of people impacted by long-term relocation); (3) environmental impacts 
(e.g., total areas of land contaminated at various levels of radioactivity); and (4) total 
economic costs.45,46 
Additional research studies that aim to evaluate the effect of including contributions 
from multi-unit accident scenarios to this broader set of risk metrics could provide a 
more comprehensive characterization of: (1) the relative risks attributable to both 
single-unit and multi-unit accident scenarios; and (2) the potential health and safety 
benefits of proposed regulatory actions that may reduce the level of residual risk to 
the public from nuclear accidents in ways the existing set of safety goal QHO metrics 
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